

valuable concluding chapter, the authors suggest that when policymakers “dismiss the capabilities of irregular adversaries as primitive, and fail to plan appropriately, catastrophe ensues.” (p. 260) In other words, policy makers (especially those in the United States) should not assume that invading a foreign country will be a “cakewalk.” In addition, they should not interpret the forces of resistance as a bunch of “dead ends” and they should learn the culture, traditions, and history of the people they attempt to rule. They should pay particular attention to tribes and clans. In other words, one might say, the message is think tribally, act globally.

Although culture, ethnicity and religion are included in the analysis, the book’s key variables are tribes and clans, which are treated as units of analysis in order to understand the modus operandi of modern warriors and their motivations. The book does an excellent job of showing how tribal and clan structure heavily influences the pattern of resistance against foreign forces. It is not clear in the book, however, the extent to which tribes and clans (alongside with “warrior culture”), play a role in motivating modern warriors. This is particularly the case for Chechen resistance against the Russian intervention in the 1990s and the Iraqi resistance against Americans since the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime. In both cases, factors that are more important than tribal values (e.g. revenge) seem to be more influential — separatism in the case of Chechnya and nationalism in the case of Iraq.

Moreover, the book is not clear about how knowledge of tribes and clans can be converted into an effective policy of occupation and nation-building (more accurately state-building). Should tribal systems be exploited by occupiers in order to obtain the cooperation of their elders and thus, expedite the occupation or, is it sufficient to respect tribes as they are during an occupation and leave them alone, and thus at least ensure their neutrality? Under what circumstances can the occupying power draw support from tribes and clans? Knowing the enemy, after all, is of little use, if the most important elements of the enemy (tribes and clans in this case) are not willing to cooperate with the foreign forces. The book stresses the recognition of Afghan tribes as a determining factor in the success of the United States in the Afghan war following September 11, 2001. This success, however, was arguably due to the presence of a common enemy (Taliban and al Qaeda) as much as the recognition of tribes’ importance in Afghanistan. That myriad tribes in Iraq’s al Anbar province today cooperate with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps against al Qaeda and its radical Islamist allies is further evidence of the significance of a common enemy in obtaining tribes’ support. In short, the book’s invaluable contribution to the counterinsurgency literature could have been even greater had the authors addressed the question of when and how policymakers will be successful in turning tribes and clans from potential enemies into allies in an occupied country once their importance is acknowledged.

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*Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Derek D. Smith. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 197. \$75/£45 (hardback). \$24.99/£14.99 (paperback).

Threats arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are here to stay. With such “rogue states” as North Korea, Iran, and Syria suspected of pursuing WMD and other states at least retaining some capability for developing them, the United States and the international community need to consider seriously how to address these programs. Given the politically charged nature of the topic, there is a need for careful, balanced analyses of the use of force and threats of force to prevent states from acquiring or using WMD. In this concise, but useful book, Derek D. Smith, a Yale law student with a D.Phil from Oxford, provides us with such an analysis.

In this book, Smith outlines potential ways in which deterrence may be an unreliable instrument for U.S. foreign policy or may even induce states to develop WMD. Certainly, a lesson a rogue state may take from recent events, especially the disparity between U.S. actions regarding Iraq and North Korea, is that the best way to prevent an attack by the United States is successfully to acquire WMD. Thus, Smith argues, a rather surprising result of the U.S. efforts to sustain muscular deterrence, “denial” (convincing a state that it is not worth the costs even to embark on a WMD program), and preemptive or preventive war may be precisely the opposite of their intended goals—they may actually cause states to acquire WMD for defensive purposes or, during crises, increase the likelihood that they will use these weapons.

After raising these issues in a theoretical discussion of deterrence and its potential shortcomings in Chapter 2, Smith then turns in Chapters 3 and 4 to examine deterrence in practice, particularly during the international crises involving Iraq and North Korea. These chapters are useful reminders of histories that have frequently become too politicized. Far from fabricating intelligence on Iraq’s suspected chemical and biological weapons arsenals, the United States and other states were quite concerned that Saddam Hussein would in fact use them in both the 1991 and 2003 conflicts, especially if (as in 2003) the United States decided to topple the Iraqi regime. In the end, Smith argues, despite these fears, the United States was not seriously deterred by Iraq’s WMD, though they might have played a role in the decision not to invade Baghdad in 1991.

The crisis with North Korea has unfolded quite differently. Although the United States reportedly did seriously consider carrying out a preventive strike on North Korea’s nuclear facility at Yongbyong in 1994, the crisis was (temporarily) resolved before the United States was forced to make a final decision. Since then, however, as North Korea overtly pressed forward with its programs in 2002, the United States never again appeared to consider the use of force to be a serious option (barring a few “red lines” such as overt sales of nuclear weapons or related technology). Although useful, these chapters leave the reader with a few lingering questions: How much, for example, did Iraq’s WMD truly influence the U.S. decision not to topple Saddam’s regime in 1991? Was the United States effectively deterred in 1994 from attacking North Korea because of the DPRK’s chemical weapons and possible (though unlikely) nuclear arsenal, or was it restrained due to North Korea’s ability to strike South Korea with its conventional weapons? These questions are hard to answer conclusively, but they have great significance for our understanding of deterrence.

Given the, at best, qualified successes of deterrence in the above instances, Part III of the book assesses the other means available to the United States and the international community for addressing WMD proliferation. Chapter 5 examines the

strengths and significant shortcomings of various “counterproliferation” methods—including export controls (though these are typically considered “nonproliferation” rather than counterproliferation); missile defense; and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a multi-country consortium designed to interdict suspect WMD shipments. For example, even the most stringent export control laws have trouble preventing states from acquiring many “dual use” technologies, which can be used either for peaceful purposes or for WMD. Or, despite the potential for the PSI to prevent some shipments of WMD technologies, it does encounter significant legal constraints, coordination difficulties, and insufficient intelligence to identify suspect shipments.

Chapter 6 examines the controversial topics of preemptive and preventive war and elaborates the significant moral and practical constraints for such actions. Although these will remain options for the United States in certain instances, Smith argues that the United States needs to clarify when such uses of force might be taken and provides a useful set of criteria when such actions might be justified.

The final substantive chapter recommends a “global quarantine against WMD, prohibiting all forms of WMD transfer” (p. 141). This “quarantine,” which is presented as a “viable alternative to preventive war” (p. 139), would build on the successes of PSI and possibly strengthen PSI’s authority by joining with the United Nations or the International Maritime Organization. Although this is an intriguing possibility, there is a bit of ambiguity about whether this global quarantine would apply exclusively to WMD or also to dual-use technologies that would assist in WMD programs. If the former, one wonders whether this will sufficiently prevent aspiring states from developing indigenous WMD programs; if the latter, international efforts may be hindered by many of the challenges outlined in Chapter 5—including a dearth of reliable intelligence on dual-use shipments and possibly a lack of international will to enforce the quarantine’s provisions. At best, the global quarantine may be a useful addition to the international community’s “toolbox” of nonproliferation and counterproliferation options, rather than a solution or “viable alternative” to the many challenges relating to deterrence, counterproliferation, and preventive war.

These questions do not detract from the fact that this book provides a very solid analysis of the many difficult challenges that will continue to face the United States and the international community as they struggle to address the threat of WMD proliferation to the “rogue states” of the world. Indeed, it serves to emphasize how enduring these challenges will be.

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*Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat*, Andreas Wenger and Reto Wollenmann (eds.). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, pp 241. \$52 (hardback).

Readers looking for a balanced and comprehensive review of the issues and problems surrounding terrorism using biological weapons are well served by this edited volume, originating from a conference held in Switzerland in 2005. Its seven substantive chapters,