

Book reviews

International Relations theory

The logic of violence in civil war. By Stathis N. Kalyvas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2006. 485pp. Index. Pb.: £15.99. ISBN 0 521 67004 7.

In her classic *On violence* (1970), Hannah Arendt noted that despite its prevalence in political life violence is rarely singled out for study in its own right. The study of civil (and ethnic) wars, which grew significantly during the 1990s, did little to prove Arendt wrong. For the most part, this field of study overlooked the actual problem of violence, focusing instead on the origins of the war, or its termination, but only occasionally on variations in its incidence. In this masterful new work, Kalyvas presents a highly original and complex theory of the logic of violence in civil wars. It is a work of tremendous theoretical and empirical richness, and is destined to become a classic in the field of civil war studies.

Taking as his starting point that violence within civil wars and civil wars themselves should be analytically decoupled, Kalyvas sets himself two theoretical tasks: (1) to present a coherent theory of irregular war and (2) to present a micro-foundational theory of violence which sheds light on its discriminate and indiscriminate variants. His theory of irregular war posits that a political actor's control of a particular region or town shapes the population's willingness to collaborate with them. Through a combination of persuasion and coercion, these dominant forces—which can be the incumbent government forces or the insurgents seeking control—induce the population to provide information and to betray those favourable to the other side. Through this interrelationship between collaboration and control, violence is jointly produced between political actors and individuals who are willing to denounce their fellow citizens, sometimes if only to settle a personal score. He develops this line of thought further by specifying two types of violence that can be produced: discriminate (or selective) violence, which targets only those who are accused of collaboration with the enemy, and indiscriminate violence, which targets a broader spectrum of the population. His micro-foundational theory of violence holds that the provision of information, which arises from collaboration and control, determines what kind of violence is produced.

This is one of the most sophisticated (and counter-intuitive) theories of violence to be produced in recent memory and it will have to be taken seriously by all students of political violence. Beyond that, however, this book is rich in description and anecdotal detail. Kalyvas does not produce a theoretically impoverished account of violence, but rather allows for a diversity of motivations, including greed, honour and revenge, that are often left out of many rational choice accounts of violence. His portrayal of the interactive production of violence also provides a compelling explanation for why violence varies within civil wars, producing cities in relative peace and in living hell sometimes side by side within the same war. He has amassed a great wealth of empirical data from dozens of cases to back up his claims and rigorously tests his predictions on the micro-foundations with a highly detailed case-study of violence in the Argolid region of Greece in 1943–4. In sum, the theoretical complexity of this work, and the scrupulous empirical analysis attached to it, will make this the benchmark study of civil wars for the foreseeable future.

1167

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Book reviews

That said, there is reason to quibble with some of the assumptions of Kalyvas's theory and his somewhat unsympathetic appraisal of other methodologies. First, his theory makes some fairly strong assumptions, namely that individuals have no prior political attachment to one side of the conflict or another and that these individuals can freely choose between two groups who are both equally capable of establishing control. He also assumes internal cohesion of actors, so that no incumbent or insurgent units will use more violence than their commanders have allowed. These are reasonable starting assumptions for building a model, but they impose strict scope conditions for the theory which may limit its applicability to other cases of civil war violence.

Second, Kalyvas clearly aims at making a methodological point about the proper way to do research on violence. In an extensive chapter on the 'pathologies' of violence research, he rightly points out some of the common flaws in study design, in particular the urban bias (focusing on violence in cities instead of the countryside) and over-aggregation of the data, which jettisons the contextual details surrounding things like crime statistics and increases the risk of misinterpretation. Most of these critiques are valid and well taken, but his somewhat scathing assessment of case-studies is perhaps unfair. Additionally, Kalyvas may overestimate the number of cases where the kind of fine-grained micro-foundational work that he undertook with the Greek civil war is possible. Most cases of civil war violence are not as well documented and data rich as the Argolid, and some pressing cases of violence in civil war—for example, Iraq—are not conducive to ethnographic work. Locating the micro-foundations of violence, as he did with impressive results here, is certainly desirable, but the field of violence studies must be sufficiently broad to encompass a wide variety of methodological approaches and to allow for variance in the quality of the data.

Michael J. Boyle, University of St Andrews, UK

The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis. Edited by Robert E. Goodin and Charles H. Tilly. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006. Index. £85.00. ISBN 0 19 927043 0.

The Oxford handbook of political theory. Edited by John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and Anne Phillips. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006. Index. £85.00. ISBN 0 19 927003 1.

These two volumes are part of a new, and highly ambitious, series that sets out to both map the field of political science and help to establish its agenda over the coming years. The ten volumes of the *Oxford handbooks of political science* seek to encompass virtually every major element of the discipline as it is generally understood in the English-speaking world. Aside from the volumes under review, they include: public policy, political economy, political institutions, political behaviour, political methodology, comparative politics, and law and politics. A *Handbook of international relations*, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, is due to appear in 2008.

Both of these handbooks will be of interest to International Relations scholars. The *Handbook of political theory* is innovative in organization and exciting in execution. It is the most valuable of the numerous handbooks of (or companions to) political theory currently in print. It avoids a conventional breakdown of the field into different 'approaches' (analytical, post-structural, contextualist, Straussian, etc.) and different 'theories' (liberalism, socialism, feminism, etc.), instead identifying clusters of related themes to explore from different angles. For example, a section on 'The body politic' includes essays on property and rights (Moira Gatens), new ways of thinking about privacy (Beate Roessler), the body (Cécile Fabre) and 'Paranoia and political philosophy' (James Glass). This organizational device generates interesting juxtapositions that help illuminate the variety and richness of contemporary political theorizing. There are also chapters discussing the ways in which political theory has been, and continues to be, shaped by a constructive engagement with other scholarly fields, including cultural studies, political economy, history and social theory. The editors have written a valuable introduction—useful especially for those new to the field, or who are deeply ensconced in only one part of it and seek a broader picture—which ranges widely, discussing the often uneasy relationship between political theory and the rest of the discipline of political science, as well as identifying key trends in the evolution of the field over the past 30 years. One point in particular frames their essay: the rise to dominance of liberalism. They highlight the sophistication of

1168

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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International Relations theory

contemporary liberalism, but also express concern about the way in which it seems to have swallowed up or pushed aside many alternative approaches. One of the strong points of the volume is that it both reflects the diversity of liberalism(s) and gives ample room to dissenting positions. They have also assembled an excellent list of contributors, which includes (to name only a few of the more prominent) Richard Arneson, Wendy Brown, J. G. A. Pocock, Margret Canovan, William Connelly and Chandran Kukuthas.

Following the introduction, the *Handbook of political theory* is divided into 45 chapters spread over ten different sections. A positive feature of the volume, and one which I will focus on here, is the (fairly) extensive account of global political theorizing. Questions about normative aspects of international politics run through many of the individual contributions, especially those oriented to future directions for research—most notably the opening section on ‘Contemporary currents’. William E. Scheuerman, for example, notes in his essay on ‘Critical theory beyond Habermas’ that questions concerning international legitimacy are increasingly central to debates among critical theorists. Aside from such arguments, the volume has two sections specifically dedicated to global politics. The first, ‘Political theory in the world’, is comprised of essays by Richard Bellamy on political theory and the European Union, Daniel A. Bell on the ‘Impact of Confucianism on Anglo-American political thought’, Ronald Schmidt on ideas about American exceptionalism, and Roxanne Euben on Islamic political theory. The other section dedicated to global issues is ‘Claims in a global context’, with chapters on human rights by Jack Donnelly, on international and global justice by Chris Brown, on secularism by Rajeev Bhargava, and on multi-culturalism and post-colonialism by Paul Gilroy. In combination, these chapters give insightful overviews of many (if not all) of the most interesting challenges faced in theorizing about international politics.

The *Handbook of contextual political analysis* is, if anything, more ambitious. It seeks not only to provide a critical exegesis of a multitude of approaches to the study of politics, but also to make a powerful general statement about how best to proceed. In particular, it seeks to steer a route between the Scylla of excessive abstraction, where political science is modelled on the natural sciences and seen as the search for universal laws of behaviour (often susceptible to mathematical formalization), and the Charybdis of excessive epistemic scepticism, the denial that successful scholarly investigation can reliably tell us much about particular locales, let alone allow us to make valid and instructive comparisons across time and space. Instead it seeks to argue for the importance of context in political analysis (while recognizing that this can mean different things), and also for the ability of scholars to make useful, albeit modest, comparisons, and to learn about institutions, practices and ways of life, in different parts of the world. This is an admirable position, defended with skill in the introduction, and elaborated with gusto across the ensuing 42 chapters. The *Handbook* is, to my mind at least, successful in defending this position. The argument about the importance of context will raise more controversy in the United States than, for example, in Britain, as it is clearly intended as a forceful intervention into the current battles over the very nature of political science that have raged within the American academic profession for the last decade or so. Nine main sections examine how different forms of knowledge (or types of practice) ‘matter’ in attempting to understand politics. These are: philosophy, psychology, ideas, culture, history, place, population and technology. Once again, the editors have assembled an excellent cast of contributors, including Philip Pettit, Nigel Thrift, Aleida Assmann, Jeffrey Herbst, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Goran Therborn, David Apter, Lucian Pye and Herbert Gintis. The fact that these authors come from philosophy, geography, economics and sociology, as well as a variety of different subfields of political science (including International Relations), illustrates the breadth of vision that the volume seeks to inculcate.

As well as their many strengths, the volumes suffer from the weaknesses that tend to beset books in this genre. The quality (as well as the ambition and coverage) of the individual chapters varies considerably, ranging from excellent to mediocre. Some are too short to do justice to their topics, while others are rather too narrowly focused. But the overall standard across both *Handbooks* is high, and they can be recommended for students and more senior scholars alike.

Duncan Bell, University of Cambridge, UK

International law and organization

Terrorism and the state: rethinking the rules of state responsibility. By Tal Becker. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006. 304pp. Index. Pb.: £25.00. ISBN 1 84113 627 1.

Globalization and modern technology have enabled today's terrorists to cause destruction on a vast scale without having to rely on the direction, expertise or assets of the state. While terrorist organizations thus enjoy a large degree of independence in the conduct of their operations, states continue to play a crucial role in their success by encouraging, tolerating, sheltering or otherwise indirectly supporting terrorist activities. Considerations of policy and justice suggest that states should be held accountable for private acts of terrorism where their own conduct has made these acts possible. However, as Tal Becker demonstrates, such accountability cannot be fully attained under the traditional regime of state responsibility. In his book, Becker therefore attempts to reconceptualize the rules of state responsibility in a way that better reflects contemporary forms of state involvement in private acts of terrorism.

The book opens by tracing the evolution of the law of state responsibility. Whereas in the past private wrongs were often attributed to the state based on theories of complicity and collective responsibility, from the early twentieth century onwards international doctrine increasingly began to distinguish between the public and private spheres. States were now deemed responsible solely for their own acts and omissions, and no state responsibility arose for the conduct of private actors unless they acted as agents of the state or the state subsequently adopted their conduct as its own. Becker's principal claim is that this 'agency paradigm' of state responsibility fails to do justice to the complex interaction between the state and private terrorist actors that we witness today.

As the author explains, international law imposes an obligation on states to prevent terrorist acts and to abstain from supporting or tolerating terrorist activity. Under the traditional rules on state responsibility, failure to comply with this duty means that the state concerned incurs responsibility only for the breach of its obligation to prevent and to abstain, but cannot be held responsible for the harm caused by private terrorist groups unless it can be established that these have acted on its behalf. Consequently, a state may provide a terrorist group with vital technological, financial and other assistance but still be able to avoid legal responsibility for the activities of that group as long as they are not locked into a principal agent relationship. The problems inherent in this restrictive approach to state responsibility were clearly exposed in the aftermath of 9/11. In response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States declared that the Taliban, by harbouring Al-Qaeda, have incurred the same responsibility as the actual perpetrators of the attacks. While this position was shared by the overwhelming majority of the international community, many academic commentators found it difficult to reconcile with the conventional regime of state responsibility. According to Becker, this schism between theory and practice demonstrates that 'States simply do not look at issues of responsibility in the technical way that lawyers have presumed that they do' (p. 237). In fact, he suggests that traditional theories of state responsibility cannot account for the international response to 9/11, nor do they offer an adequate normative framework for dealing with the state's involvement in terrorism.

In the final part of his book, the author attempts to remedy these defects by introducing principles of causation into the 'agency paradigm'. The essence of this approach is to treat the state 'as legally responsible for those acts of terrorism that are the *consequences*, in causal terms, of its wrongful acts or omissions' (pp. 305–6). Significantly, causation-based responsibility is not meant to replace the 'agency paradigm', but merely to supplement it. Nor is Becker attempting to invent a new legal regime: principles of causation have been employed in a variety of international cases to establish the state's responsibility. While not devoid of shortcomings, he believes that causation-based responsibility offers a more suitable conceptual tool than the traditional 'agency paradigm' for holding states responsible for assisting or acquiescing in terrorism.

Not only has Becker succeeded in producing a tightly argued yet elegantly written piece of legal scholarship, but he has also convincingly shown how principles of causation can be employed to hold states accountable for private acts of terrorism. His book makes an important contribution to the law of state responsibility. To his credit, Becker unhesitatingly admits that the weight of authority

International law and organizations

clearly backs the 'agency paradigm' of state responsibility, and that it is therefore questionable whether causation-based responsibility is already accepted as part of current international law. While the answer to this seems to be in the negative, one may expect that before long Becker's arguments for broadening the scope of state responsibility for private acts of terrorism will be taken up on the international stage.

Aurel Sari, University College London, UK

Humanitarian intervention. Edited by **Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams.** New York: New York University Press. 2006. 308pp. Index. £55.00. ISBN 0 8147 5831 2.

Humanitarian intervention had its heyday at the turn of the millennium. By 2003 its demise into ostensible irrelevance prompted some to ask if anybody was still interested in the concept. The invasion of Iraq and the 'war on terror' have superseded the optimism that prevailed when Clinton, Schröder and Blair bestrode the globe promising ethical foreign policies, the global protection of human rights and the responsibility to protect.

Yet the invasion of Iraq and the 'war on terror' were not exclusively justified as acts designed to proliferate US hegemony. The rhetoric of humanitarianism lives on even if it is less palatable when espoused by the Bush administration. This volume is a welcome sign of the concept's currency and a useful addition to literature in this field. The perspective throughout is overwhelmingly supportive of the normative position and, as is the editors' prerogative, does not present a balanced assessment of the debate surrounding the concept. Those sceptical of the viability of humanitarianism will find little here to allay their concerns.

Nardin, along with many others, invokes the sovereignty as responsibility argument and speaks of reconciling 'the particular obligations of international law with the general duties of morality' (p. 26). Where these moral arguments often lose their persuasiveness is at the point of suggesting how these worthy notions can be incorporated into the international legal framework. According to Nardin, 'the solution is that states must respect the authority of international institutions, unless these institutions are ineffective or unjust' (p. 26). Sceptics will bemoan the lack of any clarification of how institutions can be objectively considered ineffective or unjust and question the utility of this prescription.

Franck, not uniquely, refers to Kofi Annan's hypothetical question regarding Rwanda. Annan asked if it would have been right for a coalition to intervene to stop the genocide in the absence of a Security Council mandate. The intention is to highlight the occasional permissibility of 'illegal' but moral acts. Franck asks, 'What, in other words, would have been the cost to the credibility of the normative system were strict adherence to the law to have been the proximate cause of a mass slaughter of innocent?' (p. 144). This attempt to demonstrate international law's redundancy by invoking the genocide in Rwanda is a remarkable manipulation of events. The inaction in Rwanda was caused by the lack of any clear interests at stake for the major powers and not the reluctance to break international law. Rwanda surely highlights the conditional nature of the humanitarian impulses of the major powers.

Lu suggests that universality and pleas to our common humanity are built on shaky foundations. She asserts, however, that there is evidence of 'agency-based common humanity', pointing to the laws governing armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions in particular, the work of NGOs and the international human rights regime (p. 194). Of course these things exist but how influential are they? To give one example, did they make a demonstrable difference to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq? Do these elements of international politics merely compel the powerful to employ justifications couched in the rhetoric of the day? This is possibly a cynical perspective but it is incumbent on adherents of humanitarianism to disprove these claims, which none of the contributors here do.

One of the key critiques of the humanitarian agenda is that what is moral, what is just and even what is legal are otiose concerns. This collection perhaps puts too much emphasis on clarifying what is moral, outlining how moral principles can be reflected in international law and providing normative prescriptions for good behaviour. It does not focus enough on arguably the key issue—how moral

1171

Book reviews

principles can be made primary determinants of a state's foreign policy and how these principles can be universally enforced. It is, nonetheless, a comprehensive statement of the perspective proffered by one side in this still relevant debate.

Aidan Hehir, University of Sheffield, UK

Managing the challenges of WTO participation: 45 case studies. Edited by Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low and Andrew L. Stoler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005. 652pp. Index. Pb.: £35.00. ISBN 0 521 67754 8.

One of the things often lost in the heated globalization debate is the complexity and nuance of interactions between developing countries and global governance institutions such as the WTO. Although forceful, much of the public discourse tends to polarize around notions of good and bad. The volume reviewed here provides the empirical detail and context to see the many shades of grey between the two extremes, casting the WTO as something considerably more complicated than storm-trooper of neo-liberal globalization.

The common theme running through the 45 individual case-studies of developing country interaction with the WTO, organized in alphabetical order, is probably best understood by drawing on notions of regime theory. Each chapter deals with a different example of how a developing country interacted with either the WTO itself, another country through the WTO, or the institutional changes compelled by membership in the WTO. Where the anti-globalization forces would have us see the WTO as an organization forcibly compelling compliance to neo-liberalism—an argument borne out by a few of the selected cases—there are just as many examples in this book of a developing country using the structures and mechanisms of the WTO to force modifications in behaviour by a developed country.

Equally interesting are the repeated discussions of how industry and political groups within developing countries used actual or looming membership in the WTO to compel regulatory and institutional changes that would improve domestic and international conditions for their business. This is not to suggest that the contributors argue that the WTO has been an unabashed bonus for the global system, but that the impact of the WTO on developing countries cannot be neatly summed up as either a simple good or bad thing.

Perhaps the clearest message emerging from the collected case-studies is that the WTO is a tool, one that can be used effectively or poorly. And this points to the biggest challenge that institutionalized regimes such as the global trading system present developing countries. A common theme can be found in nearly all of the cases, where a country is shown to have either suffered from or not maximized the potential of the WTO: a lacuna in technical capacity.

As the contributors repeatedly make clear, formalization of the norms of international trade conduct explicit in the WTO opens many opportunities for interested actors to use the organization as a tool to advance or protect their own interests. The challenge is that the tool must be manipulated skilfully, controlled with a particular technocratic language built around a detailed knowledge of econometric modelling and international legal practice.

Discussions of Brazilian, Indian and Mauritian examples point to clear illustrations of a mastery and manipulation of this discourse to advance national interests within the WTO framework; more problematic are the examples of Malawi, Mongolia and Nepal.

The editors have exercised a commendably strong grip on the structure of the individual chapters, calling on the individual authors, often from the countries under examination, to frame their chapters around four sections: the problem in context, the local and external players and their roles, challenges faced and outcomes, and lessons for others. The result is a rich compilation of comparative data that students and practitioners of developing country trade policy can use as an avenue for understanding the challenges presented to developing countries by the WTO. Detail in each case is rich and tightly focused on the particular trade policy issue at hand. Yet within this issue focus space is left for a larger portrayal of each country's general strategic direction and attitudes to the global trading system. The book, particularly the introduction, thus becomes a valuable contribution not only to

1172

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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International law and organizations

our understanding of the general question of how developing countries interact with, use and are used by the WTO, but also serves as an entry point to the detail of individual developing country foreign trade policy. This latter aspect is particularly important because the countries covered in some of the chapters are not themselves the subject of a large body of detailed research.

Sean W. Burges, Carleton University, Canada

Between peril and promise: the politics of international law. By **J. Martin Rochester.** Washington DC: CQ Press. 2006. 257pp. Index. Pb.: £18.99. ISBN 1 933116 49 8.

This is a book addressing international law, written by a political scientist. It is refreshing to see this perspective on the international legal system. Rochester briefly explains what 'law' is (p. 34): '(1) a process for developing an identifiable, legally binding set of rules that prescribe certain patterns of behaviour among societal members (a law making process); (2) a process for punishing illegal behaviour (a law enforcement process); and (3) a process for determining whether a particular rule has been violated in a particular instance (law-adjudicating process)'. He does not refer to the ongoing debate between the view, prevalent in the United States, that law is a 'process' and the view, held by many European scholars, that law is a 'set of rules'.

Rochester then bravely tackles the question of where international law comes from, and puts forward some interesting ideas about phases of 'agenda-setting' (p. 35), policy formulation, policy adoption and policy implementation (p. 36). These phases are important steps in the mechanisms of creating new international rules, but they hardly explain from where law comes. Rochester mentions customary law (pp. 38–40), perhaps an overestimated source of international law, and treaties (pp. 40–43), but neglects general principles of law and natural law.

The book addresses the implications that law has for politics (and vice versa). In chapter 4, 'What happened to sovereignty?', Rochester analyses the relationship between sovereignty and human rights (pp. 55–74). In chapter 5, he asks whether new rules are needed for armed conflict and the use of force (pp. 75–108). Here, Rochester discusses some of the complex legal questions relating to military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In chapter 6, covering international economic relations, the author asks whether politics in this area has become subservient to law, and refers to the tendency of the WTO to encroach on national legislative order (pp. 109–38). Chapter 7 tackles the law of the sea and space law in relation to politics (pp. 139–58), and chapter 8 deals with politics and environmental law (pp. 159–80). Throughout the book, Rochester provides insightful analysis of the interplay between international law and politics.

There is a very useful list of websites for further reading and a (very brief) bibliography where, perhaps, the name of Professor Susan Strange is sadly missing. There is no reference to her writings in the numerous passages about 'regimes', a subject for which she was well known. The book is delightfully illustrated with some very amusing cartoons and a selection of photographs including the International Court, the UN building in 2000, and mad cow demonstrations in South Korea.

Ingrid Detter, Académie de Verrey, France, and St Antony's College, Oxford, UK

Promoting the rule of law abroad: in search of knowledge. Edited by **Thomas Carothers.** Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2006. 348pp. Index. Pb.: £11.99. ISBN 0 87003 219 4.

The authors of the essays in this edited volume focus their attention on the situations in countries that are, or have recently been, going through political transition. This includes certain countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and post-communist countries in Eastern Europe.

The book is an interesting work, full of thought-provoking arguments. The first few chapters are devoted to defining concepts and an investigation into how the rule of law has been implemented. In chapter two, written by Thomas Carothers, there is an appropriate and well-justified comment about the situation in post-communist countries: apart from minor improvements in commercial law (necessary for the new *businessmen*), there have been few advances in the reform of judicial systems,

1173

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Book reviews

which still remain largely under political control and, in many cases, are still corrupt (p. 9). The editor reminds us that the revival of the rule of law has taken on a primordial place in any discussion on legal reform.

Rachel Kleinfeld of the Truman National Security Project has written a fascinating explorative essay (chapter three) of the various definitions of the rule of law. It might have been useful, however, to have had this analysis before any other substantive discussions, as the meaning of the concept is surely decisive for the parameters of the book. Kleinfeld makes the interesting observation that one reform effort may undermine another (p. 61). For example, the new trend in Eastern Europe to establish small claims courts in order to offload the regular court system may be counteracted by other trends, such as opening the regular court system to more claimants who feel their human rights have been aggrieved, resulting in these courts being overwhelmed.

Professor Stephen Golub of the University of California, Berkeley, makes some fascinating comments. He suggests that well-meaning international organizations have misunderstood the real needs of the poor and the disadvantaged: why pour money into judicial reforms if there are no other efforts to strengthen the laws and support their implementation (pp. 105–6)? Wade Channel describes the experiences of those who have tried to aid reforms in ex-communist countries. Many of these countries have resisted 'foreign solutions' (pp. 137–59).

Every page of this book is worth reading.

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Foreign policy

Detering America: rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By **Derek Smith**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2006. 197pp. Index. £45.00. ISBN 0 521 86465 7.

Bush and Asia: America's evolving relations with East Asia. Edited by **Mark Beeson**. Abingdon: Routledge. 2006. 270pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 0 415 38333 1.

American foreign policy has undergone an unprecedented transformation in the last few years. Some have attributed it to the unipolar global order in which the US retains its pre-eminence in almost all spheres while others have underlined the ideological proclivities of the administration of George W. Bush. The consensus, however, seems to be that it was the events of 9/11 that have reoriented the American foreign policy priorities, perhaps for ever. The two volumes under review look at two important issue areas that have been at the centre-stage of the 'foreign policy revolution' that the Bush administration is claimed to have ushered in, namely deterrence and US policy towards East Asia.

Ever since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on US soil, the concept of deterrence, as traditionally understood, has emerged as a matter of some serious debate in both the academic and policy circles. The Bush administration contends that traditional forms of deterrence that worked during the Cold War years will not work against terrorist organizations and rogue states. And by doing so it has virtually redefined the US national security strategy by shifting focus from deterrence to pre-emption and prevention. The invasion of Iraq was the first test case of this re-prioritization and the results remain unclear. But the rest of the world has also responded in the meantime and deterrence is increasingly being viewed as problematic in the present international context. Yet no state, including the US, is ready to jettison the concept altogether as it retains its advantages and its success during the Cold War in preventing an all-out nuclear war between the two superpowers remains firmly etched in memory.

Derek Smith problematizes the concept of deterrence by focusing on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of the rogue states. He examines the evolution of the concept of deterrence in a historical context and argues that while deterrence has worked well in the past, there is no guarantee that it will continue to work robustly in the future, given the increasing complexity of the international environment. While his point is well taken, his analysis of deterrence as a theoretical construct is not very innovative. All the shortcomings of deterrence that he lists have already been

1174

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Foreign policy

pointed out before and much more creatively. Given that he has only one chapter on theory, one would have liked to see a more robust analysis.

His case-studies of Iraq and North Korea are relatively well done. He contends that both these rogue states have used WMD proliferation as a means of preventing US intervention and that this demonstrates the failure of US policy to deter its adversaries from proliferating. The Bush administration's miscalculation is clear in the case of Iraq where they thought that a preventive war would send a signal to other proliferators to roll back their programmes. Instead, the reverse lesson seems to have been learned by proliferators such as North Korea and Iran. They seem to have realized that the only way to prevent the US from intervening is to acquire WMD. While this is an interesting observation, it is not clear if there is anything original in the argument. Moreover, one can argue that contra Smith, deterrence seems to be working in the case of the US–North Korea and US–Iran situations and has prevented an open escalation of conflict. If only Saddam really had WMD!

The final section is perhaps the most interesting. Unlike most academics who shy away from doing prescriptive work, Smith clearly lays out the foreign policy options available to the US in dealing with the problem of WMD proliferation apart from relying on deterrence. He calls for a serious consideration of counter-proliferation strategies in which he includes export controls, missile defences, counterforce and interdiction. Smith also examines the legal and moral underpinnings of preventive war policy adopted by the Bush administration and argues that an unrestrained application of this policy will only force other states to embrace WMD proliferation as a means to their security. Finally, Smith makes a strong case for the consideration of a global quarantine against WMD by the international community that can be justified upon principles of self-defence.

The second volume under review is a collection of essays on American foreign policy towards East Asia, edited by Mark Beeson. East Asia is a region that contains some of the most economically and strategically significant countries in the world, directly impinging on US strategic interests. China is increasingly challenging US pre-eminence, not only in East Asia but in many other parts of the world. Japan is also asserting itself globally while the Korean peninsula continues to pose a challenge to US diplomacy. Indonesia, with the world's largest Muslim population, is a crucial state at a time when the western world is seen at odds with the Islamic values. It is in this context that this volume examines the impact of changes in American foreign policy in the last few years towards the East Asian region as well as the evolving nature of American policy itself.

The first part of the volume looks at the thematic issues of hegemony and US primacy in East Asia, America's economic relations with the region, growing regionalism in East Asia, and the Bush administration's evolving strategic thinking *vis-à-vis* the region. Some of the conclusions arrived at by the authors are very interesting and the US would do well to take them into account. For example, John Ravenhill argues that while the US has significantly influenced economic thinking in East Asia, it has not prevented the states in the region from using global institutions to limit US unilateral impulses. Michael Wesley points towards growing institutionalization in East Asia that can have significant implications for US foreign policy although the US continues to believe that growing regionalization poses little challenge to its primacy in the region.

The second part of the book explores US bilateral ties with significant players in East Asia including China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Korean peninsula and Australia. Peter Van Ness argues that China is undertaking some deft diplomacy as it tries to seek multilateral solutions to security challenges in the region. George Mulgan details changes in US–Japan relations as Japan makes a serious effort in helping the US to pursue its security interests in the region. Other aspects that are examined include recent deterioration in America's relationship with Indonesia following the strengthening of hard-line Islamist organizations in the country, the weakening of democratic forces in Thailand and the Philippines, Malaysia's adoption of a policy of 'pragmatic engagement' *vis-à-vis* the US, the intractability of the crisis on the Korean peninsula and Australia's adoption of foreign policies on account of its strategic dependence on the US that might not necessarily serve its national interests best.

While the two books in their own different ways focus on the impact of the Bush administration's foreign policy on the international system, it is also clear that despite recent setbacks, particularly in

Book reviews

Iraq, US pre-eminence in the international system is here to stay. It is this structural reality that will continue to shape US foreign policy long after the Bush administration is gone. The questions of the utility of nuclear deterrence and America's attitudes toward East Asia, however, will continue to agitate the minds of academics and policy-makers alike. The two books under review here can serve as an excellent starting point.

Harsh Pant, King's College London, UK

Old Europe, new Europe and the US: renegotiating transatlantic security in the post 9/11 era. Edited by Tom Lansford and Blagovest Tashev. Aldershot: Ashgate. 2005. 322pp. Index. £60.00. ISBN 0 7546 4143 0.

This book constitutes a mine of information on current transatlantic security agendas and controversies. In a sense it represents a companion to the valuable recent essay collection edited by David M. Andrews (*The Atlantic alliance under stress*, Cambridge University Press, 2005). Compared to the Andrews volume, *Old Europe, new Europe and the US* contains more information on contemporary Central and Eastern European relations with the United States. There are essays here on Bulgaria, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Russia. The editing of the Lansford and Tashev book, however, is not as tight as that provided by David Andrews.

Lansford and Tashev's editorial brief, to be fair, is very clear. All contributors were apparently given sound instructions: to identify the core security interests of the 'new' (Central/Eastern) or 'old' (primarily Western) European country being discussed; to consider these interests in terms of suitable strategies for conducting relations with the United States; and to reflect on particular sets of US–European bilateral relations in the era of the Iraq conflict. Generally, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's invocation of a pro-American 'new Europe' is not enthusiastically received in these pages. In his essay on the Czech Republic, for example, Petr Vancura concludes that Rumsfeld's 'new Europe' is 'by no means more pro-American than Western Europe' (p. 184). Ivo Samson notes 2004 polling evidence that the 'absolute majority' of the population in Slovakia 'reject the participation of the Slovak troops in Iraq' (p. 235). The future orientation of Central and Eastern Europe does indeed appear to depend on uncertain generational dynamics and on the articulation of national interests within trans-European institutions.

I suspect that most readers of this collection will find the chapters on Central and Eastern Europe the most exciting and interesting. They provide specialist perspectives and draw on deep understanding of the particular security interests and also of intra-'new European' tensions and rivalries. It must be pointed out, however, that these essays would have benefited greatly from more careful and detailed editing. The whole book has vast numbers of typographical errors. The 'old Europe' essays are much less beset by the difficulties with English expression which tend to render some of the Eastern European essays a little difficult to follow (and which should have been corrected as part of the editorial process). The Western European essays are generally competent, though they also (especially in regard to the chapters on France, Germany and Britain) cover ground with which many readers of *International Affairs* are very familiar. Scott Brunstetter concludes that post-Iraq US–German relations 'will never be as smooth as in the past' (p. 33). Robert J. Pauly Jr locates US–French tensions within the long history of alternating 'periods of collaboration and discord' (p. 15). Some of the 'old Europe' chapter conclusions in particular have already been overtaken by events. Mary Troy Johnson's contribution discusses Washington–London relations in terms of Britain's role as the 'Atlantic bridge'. The chapter is interesting, but really fails to convey the intensity and complexity of the debates surrounding Tony Blair's decision to support militarily the US invasion of Iraq.

This book will be welcomed by specialists in Central and Eastern European security. The editors might actually have been better advised to have concentrated entirely on 'new Europe'. They have produced a collection which is teeming with information and opinion, but which, despite the clarity of the initial editorial vision, has a rather overstuffed and undisciplined quality.

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1176

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Conflict, security and armed forces

Cobra II: the inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. By Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor. New York: Pantheon Books. 2006. 603pp. Index. \$27.95. ISBN 0 375 42262 5.

Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq. By Thomas E. Ricks. London: Allen Lane. 2006. 482pp. Index. £25.00. ISBN 0 713 99953 2.

The growing avalanche of books on the 2003 Iraq war and subsequent occupation makes it difficult for readers to identify those worth reading. While these books offer few startling new revelations or strategic insights, they do a good job of recounting why the US is where it is in Iraq today. Although different in style and focus, both are worth persevering with, despite their length.

Ricks and Gordon are first-rate American journalists who know the issues and the personalities well. Trainor is a seasoned and sober military analyst. Gordon and Trainor's book focuses largely on the military aspects of the prewar US planning and the invasion of Iraq in April and May 2003. Ricks covers a broader sweep, including US policy debates on Iraq since 1991, but his real focus is on the period of occupation since May 2003. This difference in focus is reflected in a difference in style. The Gordon and Trainor book is much more thorough and steps the reader in a systematic way through the various phases and levels of planning and operations. Although the book covers the wider political and inter-agency context, it is very much a work of military history. The authors skilfully combine perspectives from military headquarters with tactical-level accounts of operations and of combat. The Ricks book, in contrast, is more of a passionate critique informed by a mosaic of interviews and factoids. These are often very telling but the less measured tone is perhaps more suited to an op-ed column than to a reflective and balanced analysis.

Gordon and Trainor's book is a model of exhaustive research, including hundreds of interviews at all levels of the US military system. Although billed as the 'untold story' of the prewar preparations, the broad outlines of prewar planning are now well known so the book adds telling detail but does not dramatically change the picture of what we know. The core of the book, which deals with the march to Baghdad, is well covered with insightful accounts of operational and tactical decision-making and well-drawn vignettes of tactical encounters. What the book is especially good at is demonstrating that, even in a campaign rightly touted as a model *blitzkrieg*, the experience for the US soldiers on the ground was that of soldiers everywhere—exhausting, confusing and frightening. Sadly, although the book makes good use of Iraqi government documents to give the view from the 'other side of the hill', it is unable to give any picture of what combat was like for the Iraqi soldiers and fighters caught up in the US juggernaut. After the Vietnam War, it took over 15 years for the reality of war for Vietnamese soldiers to surface in the West in books such as Bao Ninh, *The sorrow of war*. With luck, it will not take that long for Iraqi experiences to be brought to the surface.

Ricks's book starts with a fairly standard account of how US policy towards Iraq evolved in the 1990s and the debates within the Bush administration that led to the war and occupation. The bulk of the book, which focuses on the period May 2003–2005 is more novel. Although there have been plenty of accounts of the occupation by former officials and journalists, few have ranged as widely as does Ricks. His account covers much of the country (though not the British run south or Kurdistan) and takes in many of the key events—the transition from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to the Coalition Provisional Authority, the US military's attempts to grasp the nature of the growing insurgency, the confrontations in Fallujah and with Moqtada al-Sadr in 2004, and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. By using a wide range of interviews, Ricks is good at demonstrating just how unprepared the US military was for the enduring occupation and for undertaking even basic law and order tasks, let alone a serious counter-insurgency mission.

Do the books do more than add detail, however fascinating or moving, to the broad outlines of a story with which the public is now familiar? Perhaps in two respects. First, both books make quite clear that many senior elected officials as well as civil servants and senior generals in the US government failed dismally in the preparation and conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom. While critics are

Book reviews

right to point the finger at Donald Rumsfeld and some of his senior staff, they were badly let down by many of their senior military advisers. While numerous insightful and courageous officers provided accurate and unvarnished advice, too many senior generals from Tommy Franks on downwards were simply not up to the—very demanding—challenges of this complex political–military campaign. Both books make clear that responsibilities have been ducked in many quarters to date. Second, while one of the weaknesses of Ricks's book is that he concentrates on throwing mud rather than analysing why things went wrong and what could have been done differently, Gordon and Trainor finish with a very sensible and pragmatic set of observations and recommendations. These observations demonstrate, as do some of the more sober academic analyses that have emerged in the meantime, that it is not enough, as Ricks does, to identify individuals who were either 'knaves or fools'. It is perhaps more important to understand where and why bureaucratic systems fell down so that we can address the ongoing challenge of Iraq and avoid similar mistakes in the future.

Andrew Rathmell, RAND Europe, UK

Preventive attack and weapons of mass destruction: a comparative historical analysis. By **Lyle J. Goldstein.** Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2006. 268pp. Index. £34.95. ISBN 0 8047 5026 2.

Lyle Goldstein is to be commended for presenting the first systematic study of asymmetric preventive war and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is well written and provides a useful reference for scholars and policy-makers alike. The central question the author addresses is whether asymmetric WMD arsenals are stabilizing or destabilizing for world order. He reviews cases of nuclear asymmetry between the US and USSR, the US and China, the USSR and China, China and India, Israel and Iraq, and the US and various states in the 1990s. He classifies bilateral relationships as unstable when leaders review war plans, mobilize strike forces, issue WMD-related threats, or launch strategic attacks. The author finds that small numbers of nuclear weapons are insufficient deterrents, hence asymmetric WMD arsenals lead to international instability. In addition to the degree of WMD asymmetry, conventional balances, allies, geography, and to a lesser degree norms, affect the level of instability. The book closes with a strong argument that the Bush Doctrine is less revolutionary than many scholars have supposed.

While the argument is generally persuasive that conventional military balances, allies and geography have affected the level of instability, the author greatly overstates the impact of norms as an 'important restraint' that was 'clearly significant in those cases involving the United States' (p. 152, 157). US public opinion, after all, readily accepted preventive justifications for the Gulf war, invasion of Iraq and crisis with North Korea in 1994. Goldstein's evidence that norms helped hinder a preventive attack against the Soviet Union under Eisenhower is mixed, and had the author included a study of the Cuban Missile Crisis he would have found that norms were insignificant and US public opinion supported an aggressive military response.

The omission of the Cuban Missile Crisis from this study is puzzling and unfortunate given the severity of the crisis and the abundant source material available. The existence of strategic asymmetry, favourable geography, US conventional predominance in the region, the need for a strong US stance to maintain European alliances and more than supportive American public opinion all suggest that the crisis should have been an easy test for Goldstein's theory and led to a US preventive attack. On the other hand, the crisis could be construed as a hard test for Goldstein's argument since the Soviet Union was much nearer to strategic parity with the US than were the weaker rivals in Goldstein's other dyads. Regardless, the author sells his theory short by arguing that Soviet warheads in the crisis 'proved sufficient to make the president very cautious' (p. 37). To the contrary, Kennedy initiated a naval blockade that he said he believed had a one in three chance of leading to nuclear war. Had the Soviet Union refused to buckle and the blockade failed, air strikes and an invasion would have been likely to follow.

Goldstein's treatment of international order is problematic. He seeks to determine whether 'small WMD arsenals are stabilizing or destabilizing for world order' (p. 1), yet relies upon two different

1178

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Conflict, security and armed forces

conceptualizations of world order. Throughout the book he assesses the stability of world order in terms of dyadic relations, even between minor powers such as Israel and Iraq. Asymmetric WMD arsenals cause tension and war between these dyads, he writes, thus destabilizing world order. He also argues, though, that the current world order is based on US hegemony and that the US should do what it takes, for the sake of world order, to prevent rogue states from acquiring additional WMD. Whereas Goldstein's dyadic conceptualization suggests that counter-proliferation is harmful since it destabilizes world order, his unipolar conceptualization leads him to end his book with a call for preventive military action against 'rogue proliferators' (p. 183). Despite such problems, which are remediable, Goldstein's book provides an important contribution to the literature on WMD proliferation and preventive warfare.

David Palkki, University of California, Los Angeles, US

In the name of terrorism: presidents on political violence in the post-World War II era. By **Carol K. Winkler.** New York: State University of New York Press. 2005. 260pp. Index. \$65.00. ISBN 0 7914 6617 5.

In this rather uneven and unbalanced book we learn that terrorism functions as 'a signifier of American identity' (p. 2), an 'ideograph' defining American culture through negation. Winkler describes how successive presidents from Lyndon Johnson to George W. Bush have labelled terrorists and offered distinct narratives as to how best to deal with them, from the Viet Cong to Al-Qaeda. The virtue of this approach is forcefully to remind us that terror has been indelibly woven into American history. Recent debates over the relative merits of framing terrorist attacks as crimes or acts of war, containment versus preventive strategies, and the role of ideologies and terrorism have lengthy and complex pedigrees. The implications of the chosen labels and narratives for American domestic arrangements, from presidential power to the balance between public safety and civil liberties, are also more familiar than exceptional.

Where the book is strongest is in marshalling impressive archival sources to support the argument that presidents devoted careful attention to the deliberate framing of terrorism, with extensive opinion surveys shaping their public rhetoric. Unsurprisingly, the political opportunities to rally the nation for personal and partisan advantage have likewise been bipartisan constants. In these respects Winkler provides an important and informed corrective to those fevered interpretations that regard the current administration as a revolutionary cabal of constitutional vandals. Moreover, the analysis is only lightly burdened by the deadening jargon that often encumbers examinations of presidential 'discourse' (a rare Foucault-free zone).

The book suffers, however, from three serious flaws. First, the comparative evaluation of presidents is unbalanced. Jimmy Carter is depicted as a 'tragic hero' while Bill Clinton is implausibly recast as a 'prophetic' leader. By contrast, Ronald Reagan, George Bush Sr and the current President are castigated for shaping assertive responses that relied more on the military dimensions of being Commander-in-Chief than empathy. Second, such an appraisal contradicts Winkler's own conclusions on the inadequacies of a criminal justice frame, as lacking 'a lasting coherence for countering the terrorist threat' (p. 205). Third, the tendency to resort to speculations that even Noam Chomsky might balk at undermines the scholarship. Among several gems, the notion that presidents have consistently refrained from mentioning terrorist attacks on American businesses for fear of eliciting a sympathetic response from Americans, galvanizing the environmental protection movement, and heightening public concerns about budget deficits (p. 197), stands out.

Accommodationists who favour a demilitarized approach to terror, treating the phenomenon as an ineradicable nuisance that represents the cost of an open society, will find succour from this analysis. Implicit is a notion that while terrorists may act rationally, if lethally, it is the response of the US that is frequently irrational. As so often with sweeping critiques of American counter-terrorism policies, few constructive or feasible alternatives are ventured beyond the implied suggestion that, were American executives only to refrain from 'dehumanizing' terrorists and instead negotiate some self-contained medieval caliphate for jihadists to inhabit, all would be well in the world. But the

1179

Book reviews

salience of presidential narratives to the American public, and their consistent support for aggressive responses, go unexamined. Tasked with leading a nation whose people expect values as well as interests to inform policy, the notion that freedom, democracy and the rule of law should somehow be 'validated' by a stark contrast with terror is unsurprising. But much of the discussion omits a simple, albeit crucial, element—the president is a national political leader, not an academic.

Robert Singh, University of London, UK

Politics, democracy and social affairs

Corruption: anthropological perspectives. Edited by Dieter Haller and Cris Shore. London: Pluto. 2005. 272pp. Index. Pb.: £16.99. ISBN 0 745 32157 7.

Corruption will be of interest to both scholars and practitioners involved in international development. Through ten case-studies, the book explores the issue of corruption from an anthropological perspective, and argues that the narrow definition of corruption, which has greatest currency at present, is problematic.

Crystallized by the World Bank in 1997, corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain. In a well-argued introduction, Shore and Haller outline the anthropological concerns regarding this definition, not least the marriage of neo-liberal economics and the Weberian ideal of public office dominant in the West. Sampson examines the rise of the 'anti-corruption' industry, with its corollary of consultants, committees and non-governmental organizations such as Transparency International. Sampson suggests that the anti-corruption lobby has interests of its own that need to be questioned. MacLennan gives cause to widen the definition by making the distinction between white collar crime and corruption in the US. Ostensibly, a democratic nation with regulatory bodies peopled by Weber's bureaucrats, MacLennan explains how power (political and economic) has been captured by an elite to perpetuate a system that encourages private sector corruption as exemplified by Enron and WorldCom. The idea of a stable bureaucracy rising above personal interests is also found wanting in Shore's chapter examining corruption in the European Commission.

The Bank's narrow definition is further problematized by a number of the authors. Rivkin-Fish illustrates how both givers and takers in Russia make a moral distinction between gifts and bribes, and therefore, the act's acceptability. In Bolivia, as Lazar points out, it is not that the political cadre is corrupt that matters to communities, but whether they redistribute their spoils through public works. The authors, collectively, describe the myriad ways in which corruption is narrated and enacted. A broader and more useful definition of corruption is described by Lovell as acting contrary to a given norm, and the cultural contexts that shape what the norm is. This is illustrated by Gupta in describing how government officials in northern India view the (mis)use of funds allocated directly to village communities. Using the broader definition, it can be seen that the Bank's notion of corruption is action that is contrary to the norms formed by an idealized notion of public office, democracy and economic growth.

It is arguably important to keep listing the ways in which people and institutions act contrary to the norms of their society to raise awareness within the academic and international communities of the issue's complexity. However, there is a limit to the advantages of describing 'how' corruption happens, if at some point 'why' it happens is not given due scrutiny. Examining why may point to a simple but important principle—people act to protect their interests, however those are defined, and to ensure access to the resources that they perceive as being congruent to those interests. The case-studies begin to delve into people's interests, but these are only dealt with implicitly rather than explicitly, with the descriptions focusing mainly on the events detailing how corruption happened.

Though it is disappointing that the authors did not delve explicitly into why, *Corruption* is an excellent start to the process of questioning corruption's role in societies, and the anti-corruption industry's legitimacy and effectiveness.

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1180

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Politics, democracy and social affairs

Cambiare regime. La sinistra e gli ultimi 45 dittatori. By Christian Rocca. Turin: Einaudi. 2006. 254pp. €14.50. ISBN 88 06 18291 9.

At the crux of this book lies the argument that the export of democracy and the promotion of regime change are righteous and noble ideas. In his work, Christian Rocca argues that these policies were originally conceived by the idealist left, as opposed to the realist right. In a curious inversion of this phenomenon, however, Rocca posits that in recent times there has been an increasing tendency for right-wing governments to support ideas of exporting democracy and promoting regime change, while the left is now generally against this: with the notable exception of the British New Labour government of Tony Blair, all left-wing parties in Europe seem to have adopted a 'realistic' foreign policy. Rocca maintains that they therefore tend to defend 'the last 45 dictators on Earth' (p. 188) in the hope that one day they will independently decide to introduce democratic practices in their countries. Essentially, Rocca's work grapples with the questions: Why did this happen? Why does the left not support democracy any more? What else should the left do, if not engage dictatorships and fight on behalf of oppressed peoples?

At the core of Rocca's argument is the notion that the left is against neo-conservative policies because of its anti-Americanism. He suggests that the right, in contrast, has become more idealistic and less realistic, particularly because, in the wake of 9/11, right-wing governments have increasingly felt that a country's security is best guaranteed by bolstering the number of democracies in the world. Behind this rationale is the idea that democracies do not wage wars against one another and are less likely to support terrorist activities in their territory. In addition, establishing a democracy means guaranteeing and protecting the human rights of populations that are usually abused, if not massacred by dictators.

Rocca then proceeds to highlight a further reason for the leftist distaste of neo-conservatism: as George Orwell wrote, 'the European left has been anti-fascist, but not anti-totalitarian' (p. 139). For instance, Italian and French communists openly supported the Soviet Union until its collapse. Nowadays, their descendants have still not completely renounced remnants of anti-American propaganda and have argued that it was preferable to leave Saddam Hussein in place, rather than to promote an expansion of what they see as the 'American empire'. But it is encouraging to notice that some of the most liberal of European leftists declared that the real partisans were those 8 million Iraqis who voted for the new parliament, and not the kamikazes. Rocca hopes that these moderate positions will eventually prevail.

He concludes that, if the European left wants to conduct a responsible foreign policy, they must take Tony Blair as an example and remember what happened in the Kosovo war of 2000, when Bill Clinton and Tony Blair ousted a tyrannical dictator who had committed genocide. All the European left-wing parties were pro-war, and participated in the military operations of a NATO campaign that never received the approval of the UN. What were the differences between 2000 and 2006? Why was attacking Milosevic seen as just, yet not Saddam Hussein? Rocca does not find a conclusive answer, but writes that the utter dislike for George W. Bush has led the European left to oppose a truly liberal foreign policy. All in all, Rocca is convinced that the promotion of regime change will be essential in the West for the conduct of international affairs for many years to come. It is, in fact, a long-term strategy. He is convinced that there will not be a change of direction until terrorism is defeated, because whatever the Europeans might do or say, the Americans, both Republicans and Democrats, will always be willing to export democracy, thus increasing their security and the world's freedom.

This is an excellent, erudite and well-written book, which confirms Rocca's pre-eminence among Italian scholars of neo-conservatism. Perhaps Rocca is a neo-conservative himself, particularly when he muses that 'the invasion of a tyrannical country is always morally justified, if the aim is to change its regime and to create free institutions and a political system that respects human rights' (p. 15). But he also argues that the military must always be the last resort, to be used only when political, diplomatic and economic means have failed.

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1181

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006
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Political economy, economics and development

How we compete: what companies around the world are doing to make it in today's global economy. By Suzanne Berger. New York: Doubleday. 2006. 298pp. Index. \$27.50. ISBN 0 385 51359 3.

How we compete is a fascinating journey across industries, corporations and countries in search of sustainable strategies to cope with globalization. Suzanne Berger, political scientist and Director of the MIT International Science and Technology Initiative, has translated into an enjoyable book the results of almost 500 company interviews conducted within the 1999–2004 MIT Globalization Study. The project involved several economists, engineers and political scientists from the Industrial Performance Centre and mostly focused on three industries: apparel, electronics and cars. The team undertook a systematic investigation into the most important technological and policy-led changes in the international economy over the past 20 years and their effects on the organization of economic life. The researchers looked at how companies concretely respond to new competitive pressures. 'Globalization' from this business, bottom-up perspective, is then viewed as a combination of firms' choices about *reorganization* (which activities/functions should a company continue to carry over in-house, which ones should be outsourced) and *relocation* (which activities should be moved abroad, offshore).

The book starts with a clear question: who is afraid of globalization? Why do consumers enjoy cheap imported goods in Wal-Mart, but fear delocalization and job losses? The threat is not new. What is new is that not only blue-collar jobs seem to be affected and for the first time the US economy is emerging from recession without net job creation, the 'jobless recovery'. Will there be any good jobs remaining in high-wage economies? Will there be a race to the bottom, with companies constantly trying to cut labour and environmental costs?

The study looks at how firms adapt to the new environment, focusing on industries that are most exposed to the threat of delocalization. If companies in high-wage economies continue to be competitive even in these industries then, the authors claim, understanding their strategies might help other firms to craft better responses to the ascendancy of new, powerful competitors abroad.

The study proposes a 'dynamic legacies' model of the firm. Each firm faces a fundamental trade-off: how best to combine internal resources and capabilities with those available externally (at home and abroad). Firms belonging to the same industry, the study found, are reacting in different ways to similar challenges, and there is no conclusive evidence that one strategy is more successful than others. The picture, however, is much more complicated than the 'national variety of capitalism' model, with its dichotomy between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. The firm's resources are constantly recombined in reaction to the new resources acquired and to the evolving external environment, leading to very different strategies.

Though globalization is not new, the last 20 years have seen a major technological breakthrough which revolutionized production and disclosed a new range of possibilities. Modularity has brought about the 'disintegration of production'. Technological advancements have made it possible to break up different stages in the production process. Such a 'Lego model of production' is described at length in part two. In industries like electronics and apparel, each segment of the value chain (e.g. innovation, component and industrial design, manufacturing, marketing) can be contracted to separate, independent companies.

Should a firm stay or delocalize? Part three offers convincing arguments on the relative costs and benefits of offshoring. The team found that the need to cut wage costs was often mentioned as the main reason for moving abroad, even in capital-intensive industries. The lure of cheap wages in developing locations should not be the driver of offshoring decisions. What matters is the unit cost of labour, which reflects productivity. Workers in high-wage countries are more productive than those in developing countries, which is also the reason why they get higher wages! As one Taiwanese manager put it, 'If you pay peanuts, you get monkeys' (p. 260). Why then so much excitement about moving production abroad? Because outsourcing/offshoring can contribute to raising productivity, by allowing firms to focus on what they can do better.

A key question the book aims to answer is whether globalization forces an inevitable convergence to a unique business model (and, a fortiori, to one form of capitalism). The answer is no. Although the

Ethnicity and cultural politics

drivers and enablers are the same, strategies and outcomes differ widely, as shown in part four. Branded manufacturers thrive alongside contract manufacturers. Some withdraw fully from manufacturing and only kept the brand name. Others adopt intermediate strategies, maintaining some productive capacity in house. Modularity allows companies to specialize in a segment of a value chain, without having to invest in all other stages of production, which they can contract outside. 'It's not industry or sector that's important, it's a firm's *capabilities*' (p. 255). Emerging economies such as China and India do pose a tremendous challenge to industrialized countries, but they also offer an unprecedented opportunity to reorganize the way firms in developed economies compete, focusing on their core strengths and developing new ones. At the same time, modular production has its limits, including the risk of leakages of proprietary information, loss of control over R&D and product standardization which eats into brand image. Moreover, there are good reasons and forces that keep certain productions close to industrialized markets, as discussed in part five.

The impact of the emergence of the Asian drivers on US jobs cannot be denied. Globalization is deemed to raise global welfare and average standard of living, but there is no insurance that a region or country's advances will outweigh its losses; there is no reason why the benefits associated with greater openness and integration would raise the standard of living of everyone equally. Although job losses in the US over recent years had to do more with productivity growth than imports or outsourcing, still, globalization clearly benefits some segments of society a lot more than others.

What should governments do? Although the book is chiefly concerned with company strategies, public policy and institutions do contribute to shaping firms' resources. The concluding chapter goes 'beyond the company' to explore the role of government. Protectionism is not the answer: open economies and societies are needed for companies to reorganize their business, tap into external resources, boost productivity, innovate and create better jobs. This is how industrialized countries thrived and ensured higher standards of living for their populations. The key question is whether these countries are losing their competitive edge in the production of knowledge and high-wage jobs. The authors reject the 'declinist' view, but they warn against this risk. The advent of modularity shifted much R&D onto contractors, while a narrow focus on short-term profits has led to downsizing research expenditures and discouraged broad-based 'blue-sky' research. The restructuring of major R&D labs bears testimony to this worrisome trend. The book shows how success in the global competition is a matter of choices and that there is no one best strategy. For sure there is a worst one: short-sightedness.

Federico Bonaglia, *OECD Development Centre, France*

Ethnicity and cultural politics

Islamic imperialism: a history. By Efraim Karsh. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2006. 288pp. Index. \$30.00. ISBN 0 300 10603 3.

Yale University Press calls this book 'highly provocative', with Osama bin Laden's eyes peering at us from the book jacket to make the point clear! The author, Efraim Karsh, Head of Mediterranean Studies at King's College London, suggests Islamic imperialism inspired 9/11, not, as has been argued, American arrogance. Nor was it a 'one-off' event entirely out of keeping with Islamic culture. Osama bin Laden's disposal of some 3,000 fellow human beings was comprehensible in terms of Arab history! Professor Karsh, author of a political biography of Saddam Hussein, co-author with Inari Karsh of *Empire of the sands: the struggle for mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923* and a frequent and spirited contributor to scholarly journals, explains how Islam forged an empire spanning Europe, much of Africa and Asia. He emphasizes the Prophet Muhammad's famous farewell exhortation to the faithful in the year of his death 632: 'I was ordered to fight all men until they say "there is no god but Allah."'

Karen Armstrong, former nun and now a discerning writer on religion, disagrees. In *Islam: a short history* she suggests, like many other scholars, that 'the Quran does not sanctify warfare' (p. 30). She argues that Islam is not 'a violent, militaristic faith which imposed itself on its subject peoples at sword-point'. Nor did the Prophet believe he had a 'divine mandate to conquer the world' (p. 29). Karsh offers a more robust version of Islam based on Arab military conquest in the Middle East,

Book reviews

Europe, Africa and beyond. A remarkable feat, it was, many felt, if not inspired by Allah, certainly achieved with His assistance. Karsh tells what is a gripping as well as a complicated story. Only in Europe was there a reverse and historians are still arguing about it.

Charles Martel, called 'the hammer', defeated the Moors, also known as Saracens, under Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi (Governor of Al Andalus) at Poitiers in 732. Abdul Rahman was killed and the Saracens were prevented from continuing north into Europe. No less a historian than Edward Gibbon conjectured that, had the Moors won, Islam could have swept northward and thus ousted Christianity in England and had Islam preached from University of Oxford pulpits! Yet Karen Armstrong and others argue that the importance of this battle has been greatly exaggerated. She claims the battle was 'no Waterloo'. Apparently, the Arabs felt 'no compulsion—religious or otherwise—to conquer western Christendom in the name of Islam' (p. 50). Does this not seem out of character given previous religious fervour? Once again scholars disagree. Existing records are inconclusive. It leaves one asking how Karsh can maintain that 9/11 was Osama bin Laden's hangover from Islamic imperialism hundreds of years ago. Should we associate religiously inspired terrorism, including 9/11 in the US, 7/7 in the UK and 11/3 in Spain, with what occurred centuries ago? Whom or what do we blame? Islamic Imperialism? Islam? Western greed?

Professor Karsh's main argument is that Muslims worldwide have never given up the idea of resurrecting an Islamic empire, though reasons given seem more secular than religious. Hashemite kings, later presidents, while using Islam as a rallying cry, were careful to retain power in their own hands. Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, who toppled Shah Pahlevi, was no exception. Taleban rule in Afghanistan was strictly Islamic, supervising people's morals and curtailing women's rights. Is this what Osama bin Laden wished on all of us?

Finally, Arabs were also noted traders to Africa and India. Distinguished scholars graced their ranks. Moorish Spain still impresses visitors. Recent London exhibitions have highlighted Islamic culture. While awaiting decisions by the courts on alleged Islamic terrorist activity in the UK, one cannot deny that recent events do underline how much needs to be done to re-establish inter-faith understanding. Religion itself, in the wrong heads, can lead to chronic *mis*understanding. Does being 'highly provocative' really help?

John A. S. Abecasis-Phillips

The Kurds in Turkey: EU accession and human rights. By Kerim Yildiz. London: Pluto Press. 2005. 175pp. Index. £25.00. ISBN 0 7453 2489 4.

Since the first Gulf war in 1990 and the recent US-led invasion of Iraq, Turkey has witnessed passionate debates about the future of Kurds in Turkey and Kurdish–Turkish relations in general. Kerim Yildiz hopes to contribute towards these debates. For him, the core issue is the denial of Kurds' cultural and ethnic identity by the Turkish state, which he believes constitutes a major obstacle to resolving the Kurdish problem. In addition, Yildiz questions the 'unwillingness' of the European Union to pressurize Turkey into recognizing and expanding the rights of its Kurdish citizens. He criticizes the EU decision to open membership negotiations, arguing that Turkey had not sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria.

To understand the current circumstances of Turkey's Kurds, Yildiz relies quite heavily on reports by human rights and civil society organizations but ignores the variable nature of political and socio-economic conditions of the Kurds in Turkey. He attempts to identify specific concerns and problems in implementing the latest EU-inspired reforms in Turkey. Yildiz points out two major obstructions erected by the Turkish state, preventing the resolution of the Kurdish problem. First, he claims that Turkish identity denies the legitimate existence and cultural distinctiveness of Turkey's Kurds. Second, the Turkish state tackles Kurdish-related issues principally from a security/military dimension, ignoring political forms of conflict resolution. He further argues that recent reforms promulgated in Turkey could be cosmetic or superficial unless accompanied by extensive implementation and enforcement. He recommends the suspension of Turkish EU accession unless Turkey undertakes appropriate measures to fully implement EU standards on human rights and minority entitlements.

1184

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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History

Unfortunately, there are two shortcomings in his argument. To begin with, the Kurdish nationalist perspective cannot adequately explain the often neglected malleable and dynamic qualities of Kurdish and Turkish cultures, manifested in the noticeable interactivity between both linguistic and ethnic groups. For instance, there are over one million Turco-Kurdish marriages; the pro-Kurdish HADEP/DTP parties have minimal or severely limited support among Kurdish electoral voters in the major cities of Istanbul (25 per cent of which is Kurdish), Ankara and Izmir. Even in eastern/south-eastern Turkey, the majority of the Kurds vote for Turkish centre-right parties rather than the HADEP/DTP parties. In fact, almost 130 MPs in the Turkish parliament are of Kurdish origin and many Kurds occupy senior positions in government and Turkish culture. Broadly speaking, Turkey has been quite successful at positive assimilation of many Kurds, Laz, Circasian and other minority groups within Turkey's political and social fabric.

The second shortcoming is that the author fails to mention some of the pro-Kurdish positions enunciated by a number of Turkey's politicians. In September 1989, Prime Minister Turgot Ozal legalized the Kurdish language and folklore music. In 1992, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel acknowledged the 'Kurdish reality'. In August 2005, the current Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, admitted in Diyarbakir the past mistakes committed by Turkey, declaring that the solution to the 'Kurdish problem' is more democracy, more civil rights and more prosperity. Moreover, Turkey provided a safe haven for Iraqi Kurds in the early 1990s from Iraqi military forces, allowing US and British planes to enforce the no-fly zone in northern Iraq from Turkish bases.

This book investigates the conflict between Turkish and Kurdish nationalism using a bottom-up, sociological methodology. He focuses insufficiently on socio-economic imbalances in eastern/south-eastern Turkey. In summary, the Kurdish question should not be reduced simply to an issue of Kurdish nationalism. After all, 'Kurdishness' is only one aspect of the Kurdish identity impacted by indigenous social and economic circumstances, Kurdish culture, Turkish culture, Islam and state ideology.

Hasan Turunc, University of London, UK

History

The ends of British imperialism: the scramble for empire, Suez and decolonization. By Wm Roger Louis. London: I. B. Tauris. 2006. 1065pp. Index. £24.50. ISBN 1 84511 309 8.

This impressive book, consisting of 34 essays written in the course of an entire academic career, is the work of a remarkable man. Equally at home on either side of the Atlantic, Roger Louis has been both President of the American Historical Association and Editor-in-Chief of *The Oxford history of the British empire*. His chair at the University of Texas at Austin being in British Studies, most of these essays have in common a focus on the motivations, aspirations and outcomes of those controlling British policy-making in the informal as well as the formal empire. While his interest spills over into, for example, the American contribution to the mandates system after the First World War, the emergence of an Australian foreign policy during the same period, Britain's rescue of Hong Kong at the end of the Second World War for the balance of its concession there and the partition of India, the principal centre of his interest has lain in Africa and the Middle East. He starts with the scramble for Africa and the Berlin Congo Conference of 1884–5 and concludes (apart from a section on historiography) with the overthrow of the last pro-British government in Baghdad in 1958 and the British withdrawal from East of Suez which followed in 1968–71.

As Louis makes clear in an introductory essay on 'Scrambling out of Africa and Asia', the occasion for publishing this major collection is the fiftieth anniversary of the Suez fiasco of 1956. He has always been interested in this story, co-editing an important book of multinational authorship, *Suez 1956: the crisis and its consequences* in 1989, and in six essays reproduced in these pages he throws subtle beams of light onto various aspects of it, including the arrival of 'an American volcano in the Middle East' and Britain's miserable experience as 'public enemy number one' in the United Nations. But the stage for the bitter drama of Suez, with all its ironies, is best set up by a quotation from the British Chiefs of Staff in November 1949 on the position in Libya. 'Today we are still a world power,' they say. 'We believe the privileged position that we, in contrast to the other European nations, enjoy with

1185

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Book reviews

the United States ... is directly due to our hold on the Middle East and all that this involves. If we surrendered that hold ... we should join the ranks of the other European powers and be treated as such by the United States' (p. 515). What is interesting is not just the importance of the Middle East in retaining that status but the acknowledgement that it is the United States in whose eyes that retention is essential. 'In the eyes of contemporaries,' Louis writes in this year's essay, 'Suez punctured the mystique of British power' (p. 26).

There are times and themes which force the author to deal with political leaders, but when given half a chance he pushes them to the margins, giving pride of place to particular civil servants whose professional background and methods of reasoning are carefully examined and assessed, beginning with Sir Percy Anderson, who wielded great influence in Africa under Lords Salisbury and Rosebery. He is, in short, fascinated by the workings of 'the official mind'. Of course the elements that go into the official mind do not always run in harmony. Roger Louis gives a good example of this in the case of relations with Japan in the 1930s. Sir Warren Fisher was a powerful influence behind the thesis that 'We cannot simultaneously fight Japan and the strongest European naval power' and that 'it is an imperative and pressing need for us to effect a genuine and lasting reconciliation with her'. By contrast the Far Eastern department of the Foreign Office believed in 'generosity towards China, firmness towards Japan'. One essay shows that the awkwardness of explaining to Australia and New Zealand what was to protect them if Britain's strategic priorities were to be overwhelmingly European was invariably got over by constant reference to the panacea of the base at Singapore being navally reinforced in the event of a Far Eastern war. It was, whereupon the reinforcement was promptly sunk, which Louis says 'brought an end to the illusion of both the power and the prestige of the British Empire in the Far East'.

In the case of Africa, some of the essays, backed by an enormous command of the literature of the subject, examine differing academic interpretations of the motives and calculations that caused the European states to rush to appropriate chunks of what was often unremunerative land, sometimes, as in the notable example of the British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, with little expectation of any worthwhile return. The one slightly frivolous explanation that he does not mention is that it was all the fault of Mercator's projection which in all modern maps gives a misleading impression that Africa has a central strategic importance.

In the Middle East, Britain exercised power by the means which it on the whole preferred of an 'informal Empire'. That was all very well until it began to unravel. Roger Louis has a very exciting essay on what happened after the Iranian President Mossadeq nationalized the country's oil. But the pivotal event, in his conception, was clearly Suez. He quotes the Governor of Aden saying 'in the Middle East we have lost confidence in our ability to deal with situations. Our Suez fiasco seems to have left a far deeper mark on ourselves than on the Arabs'.

Keith Kyle

Among the dead cities: was the Allied bombing of civilians in WWII a necessity or a crime?
By A. C. Grayling. London: Bloomsbury. 2006. 361pp. Index. Pb.: £12.99. ISBN 0 7475 8502 4.

Over the past 30 years much ink has been spilt on the morality of the Allied bombing of civilians during the Second World War. Defenders of the bombing argue that technological deficiencies and air defences meant that there was no alternative to area bombing, that it proved effective in reducing industrial output in Germany, that ultimately it prevailed on the Japanese, that it saved the lives of tens of thousands of Allied soldiers and—by ending the war sooner than it might otherwise have ended—the lives of Jews and others imprisoned in Nazi death camps, that given the nature of the evil being warred upon all necessary means were licit, and that the fragile conventions barring terror bombing at the beginning of the war were first broken by the Nazis over Warsaw, Rotterdam and London respectively. *Among the dead cities* offers a careful assessment of these, and other, defences of the bombing and one by one knocks all of them down.

Grayling defends the proposition that it is always wrong to deliberately kill civilians, showing that the Allies themselves articulated this view in the retrospective laws they created to try German

1186

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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History

war criminals at the war's end. He also compellingly demonstrates that area bombing had little effect on the outcome of the war and that measures could have been taken—as they were taken by the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) in the European theatre—to reduce the risks associated with precision bombing raids. As such, this is a masterful, beautifully written, comprehensive and important book. But is it definitive, as Grayling claims?

Grayling begins by providing a general account of the bombing campaign, focusing on the European experience but also covering the area bombing of Japan. He moves on by looking at the effects of bombing, both on the civilian populations themselves and on the ostensible 'targets' of area bombing—industrial output and civilian morale. In relation to the former, he points to the US Strategic Bombing Survey conducted after the war to argue that German industrial production continued to increase as the bombing increased, primarily because war production operated at less than full capacity for almost the entire war. In relation to the latter, Grayling points out that strategic bombing has almost never had the desired effect on civilian morale. In this regard he might have pointed to serious deficiencies in the logic of area bombing a country like Nazi Germany: does a worker suffering low morale as a result of bombing stop going to work and risk being sent to jail or worse? The answer, of course, is no. The moral assessment continues by looking at the origins of area bombing. The earliest advocates, especially within the RAF, believed that area bombing was a humane and effective method of warfare, claiming that it would help avoid the pointless attrition of the trenches. By the Second World War, there was an almost ideological commitment to bombing civilians, only buttressed by the failure and high costs of the precision raids attempted in 1939–40.

Although, after 1941, the British government deliberately lied in parliament about the nature of Bomber Command's mission, Grayling shows that there were thinkers and activists who were only too aware of the nature of area bombing. Figures like Archbishop George Bell and Vera Brittain argued vociferously against area bombing and the fact that the government never admitted that the RAF was engaged in the deliberate killing of civilians only serves to strengthen the view that prominent figures at the time recognized the immorality of what they were doing. But, despite all that, was it effective? Grayling clearly shows that it was not. To give an example, what stopped the Panzer divisions and the Luftwaffe was not a shortage of tanks and aircraft—by war's end Germany still had surplus equipment, munitions and millions of soldiers under arms. What stopped them was a lack of fuel and an inability to move equipment around—both of which were products not of area bombing but of precision raids carried out by the USAAF mainly. Imagine how much sooner the war might have ended, had Bomber Command contributed its energies to this effort.

In short, therefore, Grayling offers an important, compelling and detailed account. However, this reviewer remains unsure as to whether it is definitive. First, it is a little short on detail in places and focuses much more heavily on the German experience, only briefly touching on the annihilation of Japanese cities. Second, a lot of this has been said before. I think here of Stephen Garrett's 1993 book on the same topic. Garrett focused only on Germany and went into more detail on precisely who in the British establishment bears the primary moral responsibility. Finally, I am not sure that the book comprehensively deals with all the moral questions. It does not, for instance, consider Walzer's 'supreme emergencies' or mount a robust defence of civilian immunity. For these reasons, I think that while this is an excellent and important book, I doubt it will be the last word on this topic.

Alex J. Bellamy, University of Queensland, Australia

Total Cold War: Eisenhower's secret propaganda battle at home and abroad. By **Kenneth Osgood**. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. 2006. 512pp. Index. \$45.00. ISBN 0 7006 1445 1.

In February 1955, Malcolm MacDonald, Britain's regional representative in South-East Asia, wrote a long dispatch to London cataloguing the deleterious effects of US behaviour on Asian opinion. Thanks mainly to its misguided China policy, the United States was seen, not as the guardian of peace and the champion of freedom, but as a narrow-minded, intolerant bully, resented for its wealth and feared for its power. Suspicion and criticism of Washington were at such a pitch that 'there is automatic prejudice against almost anything that the Americans say or do'.

1187

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Book reviews

MacDonald's complaints are testimony to the extent to which, by the mid-1950s, fears about US policies and actions across a wide range of issues were making even America's friends doubt its commitment to responsible and constructive leadership. *Total Cold War* explains with vivid clarity how President Dwight Eisenhower's administration sought to address these concerns and rescue America's image in the world. Drawing on exhaustive research, the book covers in meticulous detail the full panoply of Eisenhower's propaganda arsenal, from campaigns to persuade a worried world of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology to cultural programmes that sought to show there was more to American life than cars, Coke and baseball. Virtually every sphere of human activity, from arms control to gardening, was exploited by Eisenhower's propagandists to sell the United States to the world. These efforts were not limited to foreign audiences, however, and Osgood also shows how Eisenhower's officials sought to shape attitudes and behaviours at home; the Cold War, Americans were told, was everyone's war.

Central to Osgood's argument is the assertion that it was Eisenhower's personal leadership that made propaganda so vigorous a part of his administration. This supports recent revisionist work challenging contemporary views of a disengaged and ineffective president more interested in golf than government. At the same time, however, Osgood argues that Eisenhower's commitment to propaganda and psychological warfare raises questions about the revisionists' contention that the pursuit of detente with Moscow was at the heart of his foreign policy. In fact, an understanding of the importance propaganda played in Eisenhower's administration leads to the conclusion that the president 'attached far greater value to waging and to winning the Cold War than to ending it through negotiations' (p. 7). Calls for peace were purely a propaganda ploy, designed to enhance the image of the United States, discredit the Soviet Union and educate the American public in the need to maintain the country's military strength.

Ideas and perceptions were indeed crucial points of contention. They were worried over at great length at the time, and policy papers and intelligence estimates repeatedly stressed the psychological components of American decisions. But the relative importance Eisenhower ascribed to propaganda work as against other, more traditional tools of statecraft—diplomacy, aid, military power—is arguably overstated; the Cold War was, as the old soldier well knew, ultimately a strategic competition, in which the fundamental indices of power were measured in warplanes and ships, more than radio shows and trade fairs. And even the slickest propaganda was of little help in the face of policies and actions that caused genuine unease in the world outside Washington. A fuller analysis of the effectiveness of American propaganda in reducing the damage unpopular policies inflicted on global public opinion might be helpful here, but this is, as Osgood rightly points out, a very challenging area of research. Likewise, Osgood's reinterpretation of Eisenhower's foreign policy introduces an important new element into the debate, but more evidence is perhaps needed to make the case that the president's clear appreciation of the importance of propaganda precluded a genuine interest in peace. *Total Cold War* is nonetheless a valuable contribution to our understanding of a little-known aspect of American policy-making in the early years of the Cold War.

Matthew Foley, University of Nottingham, UK

Congress and the Cold War. By **Robert David Johnson**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2006. 346pp. Index. Pb.: £15.99. ISBN 0 521 52885 2.

Johnson's study of the topic of Congress and the Cold War is a welcome addition to the literature. The role of Congress has been underestimated. The traditional interpretation suggests that it was a quiescent institution until aroused by failures in Vietnam, after which a more concerted effort to exercise its powers led to challenges to the 'imperial presidency' and attempts to limit that power through the War Powers Act of 1973. Johnson revises these arguments in a sustained study of the relationship since the Second World War. There have been several specific studies on aspects of the congressional impact on executive powers or studies with a more limited scope. Johnson takes the entire period and argues that the idea that Congress played a diminished role during the Cold War is untrue, and that it played a more activist role than it has done in recent years.

1188

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Europe

Johnson illustrates his study from the outset with a detailed account of the types of opposition that President Truman faced during the early requests for funding initial Cold War programmes including aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947. A diverse array of congressional members argued against the wisdom or efficacy of such aid. Moreover, others questioned the characterization and utility of the Soviets that was frequently used by proponents of a more assertive stance. Others to the right of the Truman administration sought to revise rather than reject administration policies and conditioned their support on fiscal prudence. And even though the Democrats did not offer sufficient counterbalance to the Republicans, from the late 1950s they began to discover the powers attached to 'foreign policy issues related to appropriations', the subcommittees in their increasing abundance and by focusing on international issues underplayed by the Executive. The overall picture is of a Congress thoroughly engaged in US foreign policy and one that sought to exert its influence throughout the period under consideration.

The so-called 'invitation to struggle' existed on the issue of Vietnam long before the famous hearings of the later 1960s and then the revolt that pushed for the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and moved towards the crafting of the War Powers Act. Even in the early 1960s, according to this account there was considerable congressional misgiving on Vietnam. Months before the near unanimity on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that gave the Johnson administration the proverbial 'blank check' to pursue and escalate war in Vietnam, this thesis demonstrates that there was serious misgiving particularly in the Senate and that this was recognized and reported on by the *New York Times* and the *US News and World Report*. Certain congressional members, particularly Mike Mansfield and J. William Fulbright, pushed for increased clarity on US policy but were also susceptible to administration pressures not to air their doubts in public. While the Gulf of Tonkin resolution did eventually pass unanimously in the House, it was not without serious misgiving and leadership manipulation to limit the debate on the floor. Moreover, it was managed and set in a context of Washington not abandoning the US troops already in Vietnam. Fulbright, who managed the passage of the resolution and later became a more open critic, assured members that did vote for the resolution that President Johnson would not use the legislation to its full extent.

The work develops the thesis across the remaining Cold War years to portray this activist Congress. It is based on extensive research, the list of archives consulted and the use of the papers of various members runs to five pages and acts as a good directory of such congressional research in itself. The chapters are so densely referenced and anecdote such a frequent feature, the narrative thread is at times subsumed beneath the detail. In some chapters the notes run to over 300 references. Despite all of this activity and attempts to balance executive power, one is still left with the results; the continued ability of the Executive to ignore or overcome congressional misgivings and implement foreign policies that were less than satisfactory. Nevertheless, this work demonstrates the lack of consensus on a significant range of issues.

David Ryan, University College Cork, Ireland

Europe

The will to survive: a history of Hungary. By Bryan Cartledge. London: Timewell Press. 2006. 606pp. Index. £25.00. ISBN 1 85725 212 8.

The Hungarian Uprising of 1956 was the first major challenge to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and was a grievous blow to the appeal of world communism. That it had to share the headlines with Britain's futile Suez adventure should not obscure the Hungarian feat. How is it that the small nomadic Magyar tribes from east of the Urals have managed to survive in the Carpathian Basin with their identity intact for over a thousand years, despite a cruel hand dealt by history? This is the subject of Bryan Cartledge's meticulously researched and beautifully written history of Hungary.

The cruel hand is usually seen by Hungarians as the fate of having to defend a unique culture and language while surrounded by Germanic and Slav peoples. Maria Theresa may have written 'I am a good Hungarian and my heart is full of gratitude towards that people' but the Hungarians were

1189

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Book reviews

the country cousins of the Hapsburg Empire. The Revolution of 1848 was only put down after the intervention of 200,000 Russian troops, a fact that lives long in Hungarian memory. Kossuth, the national hero, was driven into exile and Austrian retribution followed. Yet the Hungarian nobility, at least, understood that Hungary was condemned to an unhappy marriage with Austria and did their best to make it work. The early twentieth century was a period of staggering growth in Hungary, the combination of manufacturing, agriculture, banking, transport, peace and Jewish talent. Budapest was the glittering capital of Central Europe. Alas, it was not to last. Hungary could not resist the temptation to settle old scores with Serbia and joined the German side in the First World War. The result was tragic. Not only was Hungary humiliated by marauding Romanian troops in 1918 but the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, part of the Paris Peace Settlement, awarded two-thirds of its territory and half of its population to its neighbours, including the heartland of Transylvania. The author shows just how deeply the injustice of Trianon has coloured Hungarian policy to this day. In the inter-war period it was an obsession and led Hungary into a second, perhaps inevitable, and disastrous alliance with Germany. Transylvania was recovered in 1940 for four brief years but the Hungarian army was destroyed on the Eastern Front and the Nazis took over the country in 1944. A million Hungarians lost their lives in the war, of whom half were Jewish. Admiral Horthy, the Regent from 1920 to 1944, when he was deposed for his refusal to transport Jews, is given a dispassionate assessment in these pages.

There followed the Soviet occupation, the puppet governments and the uprising in 1956. This uprising was both a failure and a success. The success was that it kept alive the ferment of discontent within the satellite countries. The failure, of course, was that Hungary did not become independent. The West's refusal to intervene signalled to the Russians that we would not use force to upset the postwar settlement in Europe. It took the Hungarians another three decades to lift the communist yoke. The closing chapters cover the Kadar years (1956 to 1988) and the amazing events of 1988/1990 when the Communist Party negotiated its own funeral arrangements. The story is brought up to date as democratic governments led Hungary to NATO and EU membership and integration with Europe. Cartledge was British Ambassador at Budapest and at Moscow during these critical years. His personal acquaintance with many of the situations and key players enlivens the text and adds greatly to its authenticity.

Though this is largely a political history, the social and economic aspects are well covered. Almost every field of human endeavour is distinguished by Hungarian names and Nobel Laureates. There are plenty of excellent maps and photographs and an extensive bibliography. As a scholar and a diplomat Sir Bryan Cartledge has brought a perceptive eye and an elegant pen to the history of a country and a people that have contributed more than their fair share to the world, despite the odds. *The will to survive* is set to become the standard work on Hungary.

John Birch, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK

Russia and Eurasia

Revolution in orange: the origins of Ukraine's democratic breakthrough. Edited by **Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul**. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2006. 216pp. Index. Pb.: £9.99. ISBN 0 87003 221 6.

Studies of revolutions written immediately afterwards are inevitably hostages to fortune to some extent. By the time this book was published, the 'orange' government had already been dismissed, defeated Viktor Yanukovich was experiencing a political resurrection and polls showed Ukrainian citizens to be thoroughly disillusioned with the results of the revolution. The 'democratic breakthrough' of the title was increasingly subject to question by citizens and scholars alike. The editors have largely proved adept at managing this risk by explicitly offering an immediate analysis of the causes and course of the revolutionary events with a cut-off point of Viktor Yushchenko's inauguration in January 2005. Thus, the question of how far the Orange Revolution can be considered a democratic breakthrough in the broader sense is sidestepped, and instead it is argued that the events

1190

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Middle East and North Africa

are a breakthrough namely in the sense that they create the *opportunity* for democratic consolidation, although other outcomes are not precluded (McFaul, pp. 190–3).

Written by a mix of well-known western, Ukrainian and Russian scholars and actors (Nadia Diuk, Adrian Karatnycky, Pavel Demes and Joerg Forbrig are involved in democracy promotion/technical assistance, Olena Prytula is the editor-in-chief of *Ukrains'ka Pravda*), eight chapters focus on assessing individual causal factors in the Orange Revolution: the opposition; the oligarchs; popular opinion; civil society; the student activist movement Pora; the media; western influence and Russia's role. Each chapter offers a solid, well-grounded analysis. The differences in perspective between contributors are minor, which makes the volume coherent as well as consistent, though the editors' claim to avoid western bias by including Ukrainian and Russian contributors (p. 198) seems a little disingenuous given that all contributors share a western liberal democratic perspective.

Of particular interest to scholars and practitioners will be the chapters on the emergence of civil society (Diuk, Demes and Forbrig) and on the role of external actors (Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Riabov). These shed light on the dynamic interplay between domestic and external factors, and all challenge the view that was propagated in the Russian and parts of the British media of a western (primarily US) coordinated and sponsored revolution. The volumes of (transparent) western funding through various democracy promotion programmes was dwarfed by the money provided by Ukrainian businessmen for Yushchenko's campaign and to keep the Maidan going, not to mention by the estimated \$600 million in Yanukovych's election coffers, half of which came from Russian sources (pp. 20, 135–6).

Taken as a whole, the volume tends to focus on the opposition and mass mobilization at the expense of the other, less spectacular but crucial strand to the story: the inter-elite negotiations between opposition and regime that facilitated a peaceful end to the Orange Revolution, which was only begun by the international round-table discussions discussed by Sushko and Prystayko in their chapter about western influences (pp. 139–40). The volume would have been enriched by an attempt to explain the necessity for and nature of the controversial political compromise between outgoing President Kuchma and the orange forces that effectively ended the revolution by limiting the powers of the incoming president at the expense of parliament (where the ancient regime could hope to maintain its position). Consideration of this compromise would help shed light on the ambiguous outcomes of the Orange Revolution being witnessed today.

Michael McFaul's chapter acts as a conclusion and is distinct in offering a comparative perspective of the four post-communist 'colour revolutions'—Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005). He systematically draws out the key elements in light of the comparative literature on revolutions and democratic transitions before concluding with a balanced discussion on whether the Orange Revolution can really be considered a revolution. Although this chapter is rather different to its predecessors, it builds upon their findings and puts them into a broader perspective.

Revolution in orange offers a series of well-grounded thematic studies that will undoubtedly be of interest to comparative and specialist scholars and students.

Sarah Whitmore, Oxford Brookes University, UK

Middle East and North Africa

Confronting Iran. By **Ali M. Ansari.** London: Hurst. 2006. 280pp. Index. £16.95. ISBN 1 85065 809 9.

Ali Ansari's brisk and businesslike survey of the poisonous historical context in which the latest American–Iranian crisis unfolds is not optimistic. He suggests that any serious improvement in their relations will depend on the careful unpicking of the myths that each nation has constructed around the alarming image of the other. The Americans in particular, he notes, have a habit of looking in the wrong place. Having underestimated the role of religion in the years before the fall of the Shah, Washington's perceptions are now stuck in an obsession with Islam. Ansari maintains that religion is a lesser factor than Iranian nationalism: 'What matters is Iran. Islam may be the means for some, but for the vast majority, Iran is the end' (p. 241).

1191

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Book reviews

Ansari's book is organized around the moments of crisis, from the 1953 Anglo-American coup that unseated the elected government of Mohammed Mossadeq and installed the Shah, the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution and the seizure of the United States embassy as the diplomatic hostages, through the comic opera interlude of the Reagan administration's 'Iran-Contra' escapade. But he traces Iran's sense of outraged nationalism back to the humiliation of Turkmanchai at Russian hands in 1828 and the long British exploitation that saw the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company pay more in taxes to the British government than Iran ever saw in royalties.

Ansari, Reader in Modern History at the University of St Andrews and Associate Fellow of Chatham House, pulls no punches when listing Iran's record in sponsoring what the US sees as 'terrorism' and its grisly role in assassinating the regime's enemies abroad. He also notes the American hypocrisy in its unilateral imposition of sanctions, while through a European subsidiary the Halliburton group (when run by the current US Vice-President Dick Cheney) maintained an office in Tehran.

Although analysing with some care the impact of the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the lurching progress of the European negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme, Ansari has been unfortunate in his timing. He writes only of 'hints' of an Iranian approach to Washington in 2003. The full details of the Iranian offer of a 'grand bargain', under which Iran offered a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine and an acceptance of full international control over its nuclear research in return for normalized relations, were first published by this reporter on the United Press International wire on 8 May 2006, too late for Ansari's book. The report was based on interviews with the White House official Flynt Leverett who conducted the negotiations, and saw them endorsed by Ayatollah Khamenei's son-in-law at a secret meeting in Athens, only to see them blocked at the highest levels in Washington.

Ansari's familiarity with both Iran and the West gives him a unique perspective and a subtle sense of parallels and differences. In one striking and thoughtful passage, he notes 'America's bureaucracy shares much in common with her European counterparts, but her politics—popular, personal and replete with networks—have more in common with those of Iran. The sense of mission, the possession of an imperial culture and above all a deep sense of religious purpose are characteristics more familiar to Iran than contemporary Europe' (p. 235).

The book could have benefited from rather more analysis of the social and demographic changes that are shaping modern Iran, and of the woeful record of economic mismanagement and corruption over the 27 years since the Shah's fall. But Ansari has produced a sound and indispensable survey of the historical background to the latest US-Iranian confrontation. He calls it, with little exaggeration, 'a conflict that nobody desires but which no one will be able to avoid, the consequences of which will make Iraq look like the cakewalk it was prophesied to be' (p. 242).

Martin Walker, United Press International and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, US

Syria and Iran: diplomatic alliance and power politics in the Middle East. By Jubin Goodarzi. London: I. B. Tauris. 2006. 359pp. Index. £49.50. ISBN 1 84511 127 3.

This book provides a detailed narrative of the origins and development of the Syrian-Iranian alliance through the 1980s. It is very much a power politics account with rational actors balancing against each other, although ideology is recognized to affect states' views of their interests and battles over legitimacy—'soft power'. The main arguments are that the alliance was born out of mutual defence against Iraqi and Israeli aggression; that it proved remarkably durable because the two states learned to respect each other's vital interests—Syria's in Lebanon and Iran's in the Gulf; that the alliance proved highly effective in foiling the hostile designs of Saddam, Begin and Reagan; and that after the mid-1980s it declined in effectiveness, but persisted because the two states continued to need each other. Despite their ideological incompatibilities and short-run clashes of interest, the two regimes saw regional developments in a similar way, with both prioritizing pursuit of independent foreign policies and resistance to what they saw as imperialist penetration of the region.

Although Goodarzi appears to build on previous studies that analysed the broad lines of the alliance, he gives them little credit (H. J. Agha and A. S. Khalidi, *Syria and Iran: rivalry and cooperation*, 1995;

1192

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Middle East and North Africa

A. Ehteshami and R. Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran: middle powers in a penetrated regional system*, 1997). His contribution is to map out the detailed moves of the various parties on the chessboard of Middle East politics. He quotes R. K. Ramazani who wrote that all things in the Middle East are interconnected, and Goodarzi does a very good job of tracing these intricate interconnections. He sometimes appears to build a somewhat speculative edifice on rather slim evidence for his sources are mostly journalistic accounts, for which the blackbox of decision-making would have remained opaque. But he mines quite a range of such material for nuggets of information, his judgement is generally sound and his ability to ferret out and link the complexities of the issues impressive.

An example of the strengths and weaknesses of the study is Goodarzi's account of the links between the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Iran–Iraq war. In his narrative, the Abu Nidal organization assassinated Israel's London ambassador on Iraq's behalf in order to precipitate an Israeli invasion of Lebanon and bloody Syria, Iran's ally. Israel calculated that the Arab world would be too diverted by the Iranian threat to respond (pp. 60–1). Iraq announced a unilateral ceasefire and offered to discuss transit of Iranian troops to Lebanon to confront Israel. Iranian leaders were split over whether to focus on Israel and end the war with Iraq but Khomeini prevailed over Khamenei who preferred to stop the Iraq war (p. 64). Hafiz al-Asad assisted this by rejecting an Iranian offer of 50,000 troops because he knew this would not make a difference, since ending the Iran–Iraq war could put him in an Israeli–Iraq pincer and because Iran wanted a total war against Israel and Syria a limited one. Moreover, Asad was satisfied, once there was a ceasefire in the Bekaa, to see the IDF pinned down in invading Beirut and incurring world condemnation. Left out by Goodarzi is the fact that Asad would have been wary of such a large Iranian presence in Lebanon, a Syrian vital interest, even if such a plan was realistically possible. All this is presented as if it were documented fact when it actually appears to be informed, sometimes speculative inference. It is certainly damaging to Asad if it were true he turned down the implied opportunity to unite Iran and Iraq against Israel. As this short sample suggests, this is a fascinating book.

Raymond Hinnebusch, University of St Andrews, UK

Islam, democracy and the state in Algeria: lessons for the Western Mediterranean and beyond. Edited by Michael Bonner, Megan Reif and Mark Tessler. Abingdon: Routledge. 2005. 232pp. £65.00. ISBN 0 415 34829 3.

'Islamist politics is first and foremost about politics—who gets what, when and how—and only secondarily about Islam' (p. 212). Anyone wishing to get beyond the focus on Islam that has dominated recent accounts of political developments in the Middle East and North Africa should devote time to this tightly woven and thought-provoking collection of essays by a diverse group of authors.

From a range of scholarly perspectives, contributors demonstrate that political power- and rent-seeking play a much greater role than Islam in explaining Algeria's failed transition to democracy in the early 1990s, as well as the ensuing violence which culminated in the events of September 11, 2001. Through analysis of Algeria's internal politics and external relations, authors highlight the significance of oil in enabling an unaccountable, unresponsive and corrupt single-party regime to rule Algeria for more than 40 years.

Evidence compiled using different methodological techniques is 'triangulated' to debunk essentialist myths, such as the incompatibility of Islam and democracy or the link between Islam and violence. Hence the fourteenth chapter's analysis of public opinion survey results, showing widespread support across Arab states for both democracy and Islamic law in government, complements the fourth chapter's findings that there are some moderate Islamist groups capable of reconciling democratic processes with Islamic principles. Essays in the volume attribute the growth in radical Islamism in the 1990s to deteriorating living standards in an environment of unchecked corruption and state repression, and the rise in global terrorism to successful attempts by authoritarian rulers to direct Islamist violence abroad, away from themselves.

There is broad agreement among contributors that economic growth and the amelioration of social conditions must occur before the Islamist threat can be eradicated, and that both moderate

Book reviews

Muslim and secular democratic opposition groups must be incorporated into Algeria's political process before economic reforms can be effectively implemented. Authors also concur on the role that external powers must play in Algeria's political transformation by insisting on basic human rights and free and fair elections, since the war on terror will not be won so long as countries like Algeria lack stability and good government.

The book's main strength is its comparativist approach, showing that Algeria's problems are replicated across the Western Mediterranean and the Arab world. However, authors do not make enough of Algeria's similarities to post-colonial regimes more generally. For example, the features of the Algerian state identified in the sixteenth chapter (post-revolutionary elites; single party dominance; centralized economy; and dialectical identities) have characterized most post-independence states, including those outside the Middle East and North Africa. Acknowledging that these similarities exist, notwithstanding Arab countries' unique economic dependence on oil, may help to resolve the problems of political stasis and economic de-development which have plagued most Arab states.

The volume's production is its main weakness. Its four-part structure is not clearly demarcated (apart from in the table of contents and the introduction), chapters are not numbered, and some tables (notably those in the third chapter) contain substantive errors which affect the factual basis of the argument presented.

Nevertheless, the book constitutes a significant contribution to our understanding of the problems of governance in the Arab world and beyond.

Gita Subrahmanyam, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Sub-Saharan Africa

Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC. By William Mervin Gumede. Cape Town: Zebra. 2005. 352pp. Index. Pb.: R199.95. ISBN 1 77007 092 3.

The other side of history: an anecdotal reflection on political transition in South Africa. By Frederik van Zyl Slabbert. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. 2006. 174pp. Index. Pb.: R129.95. ISBN 1 868 42250 x.

These books offer interesting, clearly written assessments of post-apartheid South Africa from different political perspectives. Gumede, a member of a distinguished ANC family, is a leading journalist/political commentator on South Africa. Slabbert, who hails from an Afrikaner nationalist background, became an articulate academic critic of apartheid, then Leader of the Progressive Party (which advocated the abolition of racist legislation and a non-racial franchise). In 1986, Slabbert resigned from parliament to establish the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), an NGO that worked with the non-parliamentary opposition and encouraged dialogue between Afrikaners and the ANC.

Both Gumede and Slabbert applaud much the ANC has achieved, but are sharply critical of some key policies, on which their books focus. Both authors are dismayed by the ANC's affirmative action or Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy, whose main effect has been to redistribute some wealth from whites to a small, rich black elite, while mass poverty remains widespread, mainly due to unemployment of around 40 per cent. Gumede reflects on the 'huge disappointment' of many young black intellectuals at this major failure in the ANC's record (p. 223). In a chapter headed 'The poor strike back: the new struggle', Gumede identifies as agents of socio-economic reform social movements, such as the Treatment Action Campaign (championing the right for AIDS victims to receive ARVs), the Landless Peoples Movement, Anti-Privatization Forum and local groups resisting evictions and cut-offs for non-payment of rent and services (partly in response to failures in service delivery). Gumede argues that these social movements, reinforced by a breakaway workers' party led by the labour federation Cosatu, could launch 'a new resistance struggle ... If the deep inequalities of the past are not rectified soon, a full-blown and devastating uprising of the poor could be at hand' (p. 289). It remains to be seen whether these disparate social movements will be able to effectively challenge South Africa's relatively stable, well-entrenched state.

1194

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Sub-Saharan Africa

Gumede's other major concern is with Mbeki's autocratic, 'mandatist' style of government and his undermining of democracy by marginalizing and 'redeploying' critical voices within the ANC and, particularly, its parliamentary caucus, which has become a rubber-stamp for the policies of the Executive. Gumede links this trend to the long-running struggle within the ANC between authoritarian centrists and democrats. His analysis of the political manoeuvring and arm-twisting that is contributing to parliament's weak, disappointing performance is well-informed and revealing. However, he overlooks the extent to which this is, alas, common in democratic politics (though alternative political systems are, of course, even worse!). The fact that there has been no frontal attack on South Africa's new parliamentary and judicial institutions needs to be recognized—while maintaining a vigilant eye on any undermining of democracy. Moreover, Gumede shares the widespread hostility to the opposition Democratic Alliance, which he regards with suspicion even when it advocates policies of which he approves, for example on AIDS, Zimbabwe, and a basic income grant for all citizens (pp. 243–55). This tendency to demonize South Africa's small but vigorous opposition contributes to the undermining of its parliamentary institutions. Other useful sections of Gumede's book include his subtle analysis of Mbeki's controversial policies on AIDS and Zimbabwe, which explores the political dynamics and psychology underlying them, including Mbeki's belief that western criticism of his policies is due to neo-colonial racism. Gumede also shows how the determination to counter global racism drives Mbeki's ambitious foreign policy, including his plans for NEPAD and an African Renaissance.

Slabbert's short book is, as its subtitle states, largely anecdotal. His main anxiety relates to the lack of capacity needed to achieve the ANC's ambitious goal of 'transforming' South Africa. He argues that South Africa faces 'a massive crisis of delivery' and views this as similar to the crisis of non-delivery under apartheid that drove floods of black rural migrants into the 'white' cities, thereby rendering apartheid unworkable. Curiously, Slabbert does not deduce that this points to the urgent need for land redistribution and agricultural reform; instead, he focuses exclusively on the (undoubted) need for improved infrastructure and services in the cities, which he describes as 'political powder kegs' because of the historical legacy of adjacent white and black towns/suburbs endowed with highly unequal infrastructures and services. Slabbert argues that the solution lies in effective local government for which, however, the skills and managerial experience are lacking. BEE, which has driven skilled and experienced whites from the public sector, and indeed from South Africa, clearly does not help. Slabbert (like Gumede) is certainly not opposed to affirmative action aimed at nurturing black skills, or to state intervention to tackle continuing black poverty, but he dislikes the reracialization of policy involved in BEE. And, just as he rejected the apartheid regime's belief in a 'primordial' Afrikaner identity, he now rejects the 'mystical theories' of black identity being promoted by Cabinet Minister Pallo Jordan (who recently wrote a paper entitled 'Blood is thicker than water: the relevance of Pan Africanism today'). Slabbert believes BEE is 'unimplementable' and will therefore (like apartheid) have to be abandoned.

Slabbert has a revealing chapter on the support provided for IDASA by George Soros's Open Society Institute (OSI). Slabbert served on OSI's board, which in 2005 dispensed half a billion US dollars to support civil society, and he was able to observe its programmes to promote democracy not only in Africa but also in Eastern Europe, including Georgia and Ukraine.

BEE is an indication of the continuing salience of race in South Africa. But the fact that, despite their different perspectives, there is much in common in the analyses and values of Gumede and Slabbert shows that race and political affiliations are not all that matters: there are critical, independent voices who share a commitment to a non-racial, democratic society that delivers jobs, essential services and security to all its citizens. This is indicative of the underlying (though largely unrecognized) degree of consensus that facilitated the 'miracle' of South Africa's relatively non-violent transition from apartheid; it remains an important factor shaping its future.

Merle Lipton, Chatham House, UK

Asia and Pacific

Bangladesh: the next Afghanistan? By Hiranmay Karlekar. London: Sage. 2005. 311pp. Index. Pb.: \$20.00. ISBN 0 7619 3401 4.

Of the many terms coined in the wake of September 11, 2001, few conjure as much dread in the western imagination as 'Talebanization'. Inspired by a gang of ill-educated Islamic clerics in Afghanistan who took power in the country in 1996 and were finally ousted by US-led forces in late 2001, it stands as a warning of the dangers faced by so-called 'soft' or 'failed' Muslim states, which could potentially also serve as incubators of international terrorism. Since then, the idea that *any* malfunctioning Muslim state is at risk of a 'fundamentalist take-over', or 'Talebanization', has come steadily to dominate scholarly and journalistic discourse.

This book by the Indian journalist Hiranmay Karlekar, reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of that thesis. It starts off by making what appears to be a generally convincing case, which aims to demonstrate that Bangladesh—the fourth largest Muslim country in the world—stands poised to succeed Afghanistan as the next centre of a Taleban-style government. The transformation of this once moderate Muslim country has been made possible, he claims, by the political rehabilitation of the religious right, which until recently was tainted by its 'collaboration' with forces opposed to the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. However the overwhelming responsibility for this 'planned effort ... to revive Islamist fundamentalism' (p. 58), he argues, rests squarely with the ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Its determination to stay in power and its bitter hostility to the opposition Awami League has driven it to conclude a Faustian bargain with the Islamist brigade. It entails turning a blind eye to acts of terrorism committed by Islamic militants in exchange for their support in the guise of the Jamaat-i-Islami—a key government ally—to ensure the dominance of the BNP.

However, Karlekar warns that this balance of power is now tipped firmly in favour of militant Islamists, including the notorious Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Confident of the protection of the state, they have come to assume that they 'did not need to capture power electorally in Bangladesh to ... turn it into a second Afghanistan. All they needed was a government they could bend to their will' (p. 66). Proof of this weakness, he suggests, is the government's failure to pursue or apprehend Islamists implicated in the devastating attack that almost wiped out the leadership of the Awami League in 2004 or in the wave of bomb blasts that shook 63 of the country's 64 districts on a single day in August 2005. More disturbing still is the government's apparent lack of concern over the steady dismantling of the country's secular tradition, still deeply embedded in its cultural and educational institutions. These developments all turn around the single aim 'of turning it [Bangladesh] into an Islamist state like Afghanistan under the Taliban, and making it the staging ground for the Islamization of the whole of South and South-East Asia' (p. 199).

This bold contention is bound to meet with scepticism among most close observers of Bangladeshi history and politics. They will emphasize (not unreasonably) that Bangladesh's attachment, however tenuous, to parliamentary democracy could hardly stand in greater contrast to the warlord-dominated politics of modern-day Afghanistan. They will also (justifiably) claim that Bangladesh's strong tradition of religious tolerance and regard for women as equal citizens are unlike anything in Afghanistan's prevailing culture of religious orthodoxy or in its rigidly patriarchal tribal society. To be fair, Karlekar recognizes these differences. But the alarmist tenor of his analysis and his sometimes fevered speculation about Islamist hordes, aided and abetted by 'dark forces' under the joint command of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan's intelligence agencies—both intent on using Bangladesh to destabilize India—are a constant distraction.

However, the main weakness of the book stems not so much from its lack of restraint as from its lack of historical depth. While few would question the spread of Muslim extremism in Afghanistan and Bangladesh, it would be rash indeed to ignore the very different conditions under which it has evolved in each country and the very different ways in which it could also determine each country's future course. No analysis of Afghanistan's experience of political Islam would be complete, for example, without reference to the Cold War rivalry that encouraged the United States to favour the votaries of ever narrower versions of Islam in the hope that they would act as effective bulwarks

North America

against Soviet influence. By contrast, Muslim extremism in Bangladesh has had little or nothing to do with superpower politics. Rather, it is tied to lingering uncertainty about Bangladesh's Muslim identity. This has rested historically on the tension (more perceived than real) between the 'Bengali Muslim' and his supposed alter ego, the 'Muslim Bengali'—a tension that has repeatedly been played out since Bengal's engagement in Indo-Muslim politics and one that can be expected to resurface periodically whenever unresponsive governments are challenged. By accounting for some of these vital differences Karlekar could have avoided the fatal error of assuming that every conflict involving radical Muslims is necessarily part of a worldwide or global jihad.

Farzana Shaikh, University of Cambridge & Chatham House, UK

North America

State of war: the secret history of the CIA and the Bush administration. By James Risen. London: The Free Press. 2006. 240pp. Index. £18.99. ISBN 0 7432 7578 0.

Risen's *State of war* falls into the ever increasing category of books dedicated to revealing the flawed internal process of the Bush administration's handling of Iraq, its policy constructions after 9/11 and the Middle East more broadly. Risen is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist for the *New York Times*. He was a member of the winning team of reporters who covered the initial reporting on 9/11 and terrorism in 2002. From that vantage point he brings several vignettes on the secret history of the CIA during the Bush administration with particular stories on the duplicity on WMD, the allegation of extensive domestic spying by the National Security Agency, a rogue operation that provided nuclear blueprints for a particular device to Iran, the absence of planning and follow through that facilitated the growth of the narcotics industry in Afghanistan, domestic spying and the protection of Bush's reputation through the creation of a 'zone of deniability'. He also provides a deft portrait of some of the key principals and protagonists in the Bush administration. Given the focus on the CIA, that of its director, George Tenet, is particularly astute and amplifies on the well-known story that led to the comment that the case for WMD in Iraq was a 'slam dunk', which he later regretted.

Risen is obviously very well connected and tells his stories with the attention to structure and plot that is often missing from such work, and frequently not a feature of more academic studies of the Bush administration. As such he has produced a highly readable book. The obvious downside to such an account is that much of the information is derived from his personal contacts and sources; there are no references to trace. That said, the related material rings with a tone of credibility and certainly in most cases backs up reports through the media over the past few years.

The string of inadequacies at the CIA is set against a prologue dealing with the more conservative and cautious administration of George Bush Sr who was increasingly concerned that the 'neo-conservative ideologues' exerted too much influence over foreign policy. If the policies were contentious the process and managerial systems are exposed through endless tales of incompetence, from the lack of debate on the invasion of Iraq, to the move taken by Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi army. Moreover, the book details the process through which the CIA moved under its director to adopt the position of advocacy rather than dispassionate analysis of intelligence. Risen paints the picture of an agency in disarray. Many Cold War agents had left the CIA after the demise of the Soviet Union, the area analysts and reporting process were no longer based on long-held expertise on particular regions or countries. The reporting process and depth of the analysis are described as equivalent to those of reporters moving quickly from one area to the next rather than of the acquired sophistication and depth of knowledge developed in earlier times. The effect produced reporting based on assumption that was often not verified.

This was coupled with the ambition of some within the agency to provide Bush with the necessary material to press his administration's agenda. Risen describes at some length through multiple backgrounders, the 'fevered climate created throughout the government by the president and his senior advisors'. If Bush sent the signals, if not the direct orders, Risen demonstrates, the 'most ambitious got the message'. Intelligence was thus created to accord with the policy. The most ambitious, even at

1197

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Book reviews

times very junior, analysts could get their work up the line, without due processing and verification, if it reflected the desired signals. This atmosphere prevailed throughout the period when the decision to move on Iraq was taken, through the debates and humiliating presentation made by Colin Powell on WMD at the UN, and even after the initial invasion of Iraq, as the situation began to deteriorate, the CIA station chief in Baghdad wrote a critical report on the looming strength of the insurgencies that soon led to his transfer. The contexts of the stories are familiar and the details confirm earlier accounts of the process, though of course now concentrated on the CIA's internal process.

David Ryan, University College Cork, Ireland

The United States and right-wing dictatorships. By David F. Schmitz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2006. 244pp. Index. Pb.: £14.99. ISBN 0 521 67853 6.

In *Thank God they're on our side* (1999), David Schmitz argued that, in the period between the Bolshevik revolution and the early Cold War, US support for right-wing dictators was axiomatic because they provided both a bulwark against the spread of communism among people considered to be too politically immature for democracy and offered a propitious environment for US trade and investment, even though such a policy choice contradicted self-proclaimed US values. The merits of this policy were rarely debated and, then, only in the rarefied atmosphere of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Schmitz's new work, covering the years between the Vietnam war and the end of the Cold War, examines how this guiding principle came to be challenged.

The US foreign policy consensus during the early Cold War rested on a bipolar division of the world. 'This paradigm meant that any right-wing dictatorship was part of the free world, no matter how brutal the government, as long as it was anti-communist, provided stability, and supported US Cold War policies' (p. 57). This worldview was to be the basis of the Nixon and Reagan doctrines. It was in line with this containment logic that the US welcomed the coming to power in 1965 of the Mobutu regime in the Congo and that of Suharto in Indonesia. Modernization theory provided a subsidiary rationale for supporting such dictatorships; only they could guarantee the requisite stability during the transition from a traditional to a modern society, a period when Third World nations were most vulnerable to the siren call of communism. This view found embodiment in the 1969 Rockefeller report on Latin America.

The intense domestic debate over the Vietnam war resulted in the breakdown of this foreign policy consensus. It led to an increased role for Congress in the formation of foreign policy and to a greater need for the executive branch to pay heed to public opinion. Senator Frank Church, whose views are cited at length, personifies for Schmitz the post-Vietnam quest for a more moral foreign policy, one more congruent with stated US values. The Church Committee hearings of 1975-6, which lifted the veil on the US role in the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile and the establishment of the Pinochet dictatorship, 'broadened the range of legitimate dissent and changed the discourse on American policy toward right-wing dictatorships' (p. 7). The Carter administration is credited with distancing the US from these regimes, such as the Shah's Iran and Somoza's Nicaragua, by injecting a human rights component into US foreign policy. Although fully attuned to US national security interests, Carter was conscious that continued support for dictatorships in the longer term undermined stability and bred anti-American sentiment. The difficulties encountered by the Reagan administration in returning to the *nostra* of the early Cold War were the measure of the changes wrought in the 1970s. Both Congress and public opinion prevented Reagan from providing full support for the Salvadorean regime, forced him to abandon his policy of 'constructive engagement' towards South Africa in favour of sanctions, and obliged him to abandon the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines.

One of the author's primary concerns is to map out the rationale behind US support for right-wing dictators and the post-Vietnam critique of this policy. To this end, he proffers copious synopses of the arguments set forth in internal memoranda, such as the 1977 Presidential Review Memorandum laying out arguments for pursuing a policy based on human rights rather than a policy of *realpolitik* as practised by Henry Kissinger. He also draws from such rare published opinion pieces on the

1198

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Latin America and Caribbean

strategy of supporting dictatorial regimes as former administration insider William Bundy's October 1975 article in *Foreign Affairs*, offering tepid criticism of the policies that he had once endorsed; and Jeane Kirkpatrick's notorious (and, in retrospect, disproven) thesis, published in *Commentary* in 1979, that sought to draw a distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes over their relative prospects for democratization. This policy debate is interwoven with a series of case-studies (Congo, Indonesia, Greece, Chile, Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador, South Africa and the Philippines) based largely on archival research.

Like many other authors of works critical of US foreign policy, Schmitz exhibits an abiding faith in US values as enshrined in the constitution; he appears to be a true believer in the notion of US exceptionalism. In contrast to Tony Smith's proposition in *America's mission* (1994) that democracy promotion represented the central goal of US foreign policy in the twentieth century, he infers rather that the US has lost its way in the long struggle against communism and is in need of adding substance to the rhetoric behind its mission. This leads him to exaggerate perhaps the depth of changes in US policy under Carter. The debate under Carter was not over the goal of maintaining political stability in nations of critical importance to US national security, but over the means. Authoritarian rulers, such as the Shah and Somoza, had become liabilities and US policy was redirected to preserving, albeit in vain, the institutions of the *ancien régime*—the Iranian military and the Nicaraguan National Guard—in the hope of preventing anti-American radicals from attaining power. It was this logic which finally convinced Reagan to abandon support for Marcos and to change US policy towards Chile in the mid-1980s from supporting the dictatorship to promoting a democratic transition to avert a popular uprising against the regime. Moreover, there was substance to the so-called Vietnam Syndrome, as much for Reagan as for Carter. In the wake of the Vietnam debacle unilateral US intervention was not politically feasible, hence the belated (and unsuccessful) attempt to promote the interposition of an Organization of American States peacekeeping force in Nicaragua in June 1979. The *contra* war against the Sandinistas also had its inception under Carter.

Nonetheless, this volume is a worthy successor to Schmitz's earlier work. It is both measured in its argument and non-polemical in style. The recent US reversion to an apparent strategy of supporting authoritarian regimes as part of the 'war on terror' bespeaks its contemporary relevance for public policy.

Philip Chrimes

Latin America and Caribbean

When states kill: Latin America, the US and technologies of terror. Edited by Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor Rodríguez. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 2005. 374pp. Index. Pb.: £14.95. ISBN 0 292 70679 0.

Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor Rodríguez have assembled a valuable volume that seeks to advance an explanation of state terror in Latin and Central America which relies on the influence of the United States and the 'US-dominated regional system' (p. 4). The contributions are of signally high quality—each is careful, rigorous, authoritative and exceptionally detailed. They document the role of the United States government and US military actors in complying with, acquiescing to, sponsoring, directly fomenting and/or participating in sustained periods of systematic, horrifyingly brutal state-directed political violence against Latin and Central American citizenries. In so doing, they provide a useful corrective to those who believe that these periods of human rights abuses belong exclusively to a time now several decades in the past, associated with military dictatorships and dirty wars, which has little to do with modern, 'democratic' Latin America. Rather, they show how the continuing militarization of both the region and specific countries within it, as part of the US's regional security strategies and bound up with such policy priorities as the war on drugs and contemporary counter-insurgency efforts, has the effect of not only tacitly sanctioning but, in many cases, directly sponsoring the perpetuation of state violence and state terror. The book is a disconcerting and often profoundly disturbing account of this perpetuation in both its historical and its contemporary forms.

1199

International Affairs 82: 6, 2006

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Book reviews

Like the majority of edited books, one could raise questions about how well the volume hangs together as a whole and how well it advances a concrete argument or approach, consistent with the editors' stated aims. This one does pretty well on both counts. There are a couple of chapters in which the analytical emphasis on the influence of the US and the US-dominated system seems, at best, tangential—as in M. Gabriela Torres's otherwise fine essay on cadaver reports in Guatemala. In this chapter, there is a bit tacked onto the front about the US but the chapter's principal focus and interest is very different from the one we are introduced to by the editors and, indeed, in the preceding chapters. Likewise, there are a couple of chapters which seem to tell us little more than we already knew before picking up this volume, namely, that the United States is deeply implicated in the political culture of state violence and human rights violations that has long defined the region. Nevertheless, the value of these chapters is in the meticulous detail offered to support this argument in the cases of individual countries. In this, on the whole, the chapters and indeed the volume as a whole succeed admirably in offering us something genuinely valuable and distinctive.

What the book does less well with, however, is a conceptual or theoretical framework within which to understand its subject-matter. Indeed, the allusions to theoretical material in the introduction are in my view the book's weakest element. The editors mention several key authors and ideas that could broadly be described as representing the field of political economy, but there is almost nothing in the volume that hints at a political economy of state terror, let alone a distinctively 'political economy' approach. What we do have in this vein are a few scattered references to the ways in which one of the purposes served by the US-sponsored militarization of the region is the protection of US economic and financial interests, but this is essentially a descriptive assertion and is not developed in any systematic manner, either empirically or theoretically. Indeed, the emphasis in the rest of the introduction seems to be on geopolitics and the inter-American state system. Equally, the editors tell us that one of the elements of the rationale for the volume concerns the 'rise of global theories in the social sciences', which 'enables greater theoretical comprehension of the US systematic involvement with state methods of coercion in Latin America' (p. 5). However, we are not told what these 'global theories' are and they are not developed in the volume as an approach that would enable this greater theoretical comprehension.

The final point worth making in this regard is that an understanding of the US-dominated regional system in a 'structural' sense is also underdeveloped. Most of the chapters rely on a notion of US *policy* towards the region and individual countries in it, but one is aware that this is not quite what the editors set out as their concern with a 'system'. Nevertheless, this distinction is also less than clear in the introduction, and it is certainly the emphasis on US policy (rather than the US as representing or constructing structural or systemic context) which is the most explicit and, indeed, convincing.

Nevertheless, if taken on other terms, the volume represents an extremely valuable contribution to our understandings of one of the most disturbing aspects of historical and contemporary Latin and Central American politics and culture. It does not necessarily tell us anything entirely new in its overall argument about the influence of the United States, but readers will surely find here a wealth of detail which *is* new to them and adds to their overall understanding of the processes and politics of state terror and human rights abuses in the region.

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Contesting citizenship in Latin America: the rise of indigenous movements and the postliberal challenge. By Deborah J. Yashar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005. 308pp. Index. £24.99. ISBN 0 521 53480 1.

The last two decades have witnessed the unprecedented emergence in Latin America of indigenous movements that have sought to challenge the homogenizing nation-building projects of the past. They have attempted to redefine the very nature of the state by insisting on its multi-ethnic and pluri-national character. The issues of territorial autonomy, bi-cultural education and legal pluralism have been placed on the national agenda. Indigenous leaders have also aspired to political office; in December 2005 Evo Morales, for example, was the first indigenous person to be elected president of

1200

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Latin America and Caribbean

Bolivia, a country with an indigenous majority.

Deborah Yashar's book seeks to explain why strong indigenous movements have emerged in Ecuador and Bolivia but not in Peru, countries with a similar geographic, demographic, historical and political profile. The reason lies, she argues, in the changing nature of citizenship regimes, which provided the motive for indigenous mobilization, as well as the existence of trans-community networks and political associated space, the key variables that determined both the capacity and the opportunity to organize. This succinct argument is fleshed out in considerable detail in the three case-studies.

All three countries experienced corporatist citizenship regimes—under the MNR (*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*) in Bolivia in the 1950s and under reformist military governments in Peru and Ecuador in the 1960s and 1970s—which privileged corporatist modes of interest intermediation and extended social rights. These regimes 'recognized Indians' freedom from elite control, recatalogued Indians as peasants, and as such, granted them rights and access previously denied them' (p. 61). They also inadvertently afforded them at the same time a degree of indigenous corporate autonomy, a contention that runs counter to prior assumptions in the literature about their pervasive reach. The erosion of these corporatist regimes, their replacement by neo-liberal citizenship regimes that privileged the individual and drastically curtailed social rights while allowing greater political associated space, resulted in a diminution of that autonomy and provided the spur to indigenous mobilization. Only where there existed community networks to act as building blocks for first regional, and then national, movements and the freedom to organize following the establishment of civilian governments were these movements able to thrive.

Yashar's analysis draws attention to sub-national variations in the pattern of indigenous mobilization. In the Ecuadorian Amazon, indigenous groups responded more to the intrusive effects of colonization projects and oil exploration than to historically weak state incursion. In highland Bolivia, weak market penetration and the survival of indigenous structures in the La Paz region permitted the Kataristas to mobilize at an earlier date than in Cochabamba, where indigenous communities had been displaced by corporatist union structures and stronger market forces. Even in Peru, where no national or regional indigenous movement has emerged, there has been mobilization in parts of the Amazon and among the Aymara in the southern Andes.

The bulk of this work is devoted to explaining the reasons for the emergence of the first generation of indigenous movements in the 1970s and 1980s. The final chapter presents a brief consideration of some of the challenges faced by these movements in the post-liberal era: the question of leadership succession; the dilemmas faced by those indigenous leaders who have sought political office; the inability to translate movement success into electoral achievement; and the factionalism that has resulted from greater involvement in the national political arena.

Yashar's tripartite argument, which rests on motive, capacity and opportunity, offers a plausible explanation for the emergence and non-emergence of indigenous movements in the three countries she has chosen as part of her most similar systems research design. The applicability of her theoretical model to countries such as Guatemala and Mexico must, however, remain moot since her treatment of them is rather cursory despite her stated intent to include them in her subset of countries to be analysed. Moreover, her argument does little to elucidate the success of the indigenous movement in a country like Colombia, where Indians constituted a small percentage of the population and that experienced a rather different history.

Overall, the book benefits from both a vigorous argument and from the clarity of its exposition. It is a stimulating contribution to the debate on the reasons behind the emergence of this important new phenomenon in Latin American politics.

Philip Chrimes

