

finances are not levied, and owners/managers are not indicted as criminals, so fear of the law is eliminated. The unchecked immigration flows continue to benefit the business community and the consuming public.

Some scholars may object to a focus upon the state as the prime agent of policymaking in setting political agendas and linking domestic and international politics concerning immigration and national security. A statist paradigm doesn't account well for the nuances at play, as attempts by one group to improve its national identity and security are often accompanied by less security for other groups (immigrants). The process by which threats are constructed internationally or domestically may be under-theorized in the book. Nevertheless, add this book to your reading list.

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Detering America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Derek D. Smith. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 210 pp. Cloth, \$75.00; paper, \$24.99.

There are four broad policy responses one can pursue toward states that are acquiring new weapons capabilities: deterrence, diplomacy, defense, and preventive war. Because nuclear weapons were viewed as impossible to defend against, and preventive war was thought too costly and uncertain of success, the United States relied heavily on deterrence and diplomacy in the Cold War and the first ten years thereafter. However, conservatives long chafed at the idea that mutual assured destruction and arms control treaties constrained the United States as well as, or more than, its adversaries. When George W. Bush was elected, therefore, it was natural that there would be a demotion of deterrence and diplomacy in favor of defense and preventive war. Shortly after taking office, President Bush moved to deploy a national missile defense system and cast off the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, preventive war was enshrined in the National Security Strategy of the United States. Interceptor missiles in the ground in Fort Greely, Alaska and American troops on the ground in Baghdad are the practical results of this theoretical revolution in foreign policy.

Derek Smith focuses on the decline of deterrence theory and U.S. relations with rogue states, particularly Iraq and North Korea. He begins with a review of deterrence theory, focusing on the difficulty of making one's commitments credible to the adversary, and the danger of extremist leaders who may not be deterrable even by credible threats of nuclear retaliation. He then discusses Iraq, from the 1991 Gulf War to the 2003 invasion. In the Gulf War, key questions include whether Iraqi chemical and biological weapons helped deter the U.S. from driving on to Baghdad and toppling the regime, and whether U.S. threats of nuclear retaliation prevented their use in defense of Kuwait. In

Korea, the North Korean ability to threaten Seoul with artillery bombardment helped deter the United States in the 1994 nuclear crisis, and its growing nuclear capabilities only strengthened the apparent U.S. decision to eschew preventive war in this case.

Smith shifts to a discussion of alternatives to deterrence. He briefly discusses options such as missile defense, preventive air strikes, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a multilateral effort to interdict weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the high seas. He then turns to the topic of preventive war and discusses the difficulty in justifying it under international law, and offers some criteria for deciding when to wage a preventive war. Finally, he recommends a policy of strengthening the PSI with legal backing from the UN Security Council to make it more legitimate and universal, in an effort to develop a regime to prohibit the international transfer of WMD.

The book is a well-written introduction to deterrence theory and some of the contemporary issues that confront it. Smith is measured in his arguments and conclusions, and his recommendations for developing a global regime to prohibit and interdict WMD transfer are worth exploring. Those desiring a refresher or primer on deterrence theory and its current application will find the book of use. However, the book may miss the mark for other audiences. Scholars will find it too much of a review that does not really move the ball forward on either deterrence theory or its empirical application. Readers interested in current events may find the empirical chapters too brief to offer satisfying accounts of U.S. policy toward Iraq or North Korea, in comparison to the many works available on those topics. The book may remain too close to its origins as a very good masters thesis to really contribute much to the debate on the role of deterrence and its alternatives in current U.S. foreign policy.

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Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics by Carol Lancaster. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2006. 288 pp. \$20.00.

Much of the focus on foreign aid has been a debate on “how much” and “how effective.” Carol Lancaster’s compelling new book asks a different set of questions: Why is foreign aid given? What determines the foreign aid stance and preferences of donor nations? While “aid began as a temporary expedient of Cold War diplomacy” (p. 5), according to Lancaster, it has now evolved into a virtually universal norm that rich countries need to give money to poor countries. Despite that norm, aid programs continue to vary greatly in their amounts, purposes, recipients, and uses. This book convincingly demonstrates through case studies how domestic politics in donor nations affects those decisions.

The book starts off with some basic definitions and a useful conceptual framework: in domestic politics, the interplay among ideas, institutions, and in-