

organizations with no stake in the state's future. This implies that unless it can be checked, a campaign of violence can go on independent of the détente between India and Pakistan. And finally, it depends on the willingness of the Pakistanis themselves to accept a solution that would require a significant compromise.

On the Indian side, Swami points out (p. 217) that from an early stage of the *Jihadi* movement, Indian policy-makers have engineered "appalling abuses of democracy." These disastrous policies have done more to turn ordinary Kashmiris against India than the campaigns waged by the *Mujahideens*. Most importantly, India must come to grips with its own history of periodic pogroms that leave the Muslims in Kashmir insecure about their future in a Hindu majority country.

This is a well-balanced, well-researched book. Praveen Swami has made a major contribution toward our understanding of this longstanding conflict in, what is often referred to as, the "most dangerous region of the world."

Derek D. Smith. *Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 159 pp; \$24.99. ISBN: 0521683130.

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Sixteen years after the fall of the Soviet Union, international security analysts and policymakers continue to grapple with the security environment that has more or less replaced the bipolar animosities of the cold war. Derek Smith's *Deterring America* goes a long way towards bounding one very important aspect of the new security environment: how the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is changing the face of traditional deterrence dynamics. Smith convincingly argues that the United States is finding its overwhelming WMD capabilities increasingly ineffective in deterring the actions of what he refers to as 'rogue states'. Furthermore, actual and potential proliferators are discovering that the US fears deterrence by means of WMD, even with the obvious a-symmetries in WMD capabilities. This fear of WMD has allowed rogue states a tool for advancing regime goals that might not have been achieved through other means.

Smith begins his discussion with a reevaluation of Cold War deterrence theory and practice and how this paradigm is no longer applicable to current realities of strategic deterrence. He arrives at the conclusion in Part I that earlier conceptions of deterrence theory in the post-Cold War environment were deeply flawed and in need of reevaluation. This is the strongest section of his book as his clarity, focus and depth are outstanding.

In Part II, Smith ventures to extrapolate the dynamics of the new deterrence environment through the case studies of Iraq and North Korea. The case of Iraq highlights the fact that the US can potentially continue to utilize its WMD capabilities to deter certain rogue state actions even under threat from the rogue state's own WMD. The choice of Iraq is an excellent case study for this book to explore. Smith covers most of the relevant issues from the threats and counter-threats preceding Operation Desert Storm to the run up to the most recent Gulf War. In his discussion of Iraq, Smith chooses to leave out an analysis of the motivations and intentions behind Iraq's continued WMD procurement and development efforts. The strategic

motivations behind WMD development are essential for understanding the new deterrence environment and more focus on this could have further improved the chapter.

After offering proof that his theories of the new deterrence dynamic are evidenced in actual events involving Iraq and North Korea, Smith undertakes to explain in Part III how the US has reacted to its deterrence limitations. He addresses the so-called “Bush Doctrine” of preemptive and preventive war and other aspects of the Administration’s counter-proliferation policies. Part III appears to be designed to progress from identifying the current limitations of nonproliferation and counter-proliferation policies to what Smith believes is an opportunity to internationalize the effort through a global quarantine against WMD proliferation. He provides the basic tenants of how this quarantine will support and strengthen the efforts of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as well as the quarantine’s institutionalization through its foundation as a multilateral effort coordinated by the United Nations and its sister organizations such as the International Maritime Organization.

*Deterring America* is overall an excellent effort at exploring WMD deterrence in the post-Cold War environment. However, one issue that is not fully clarified is the distinction between rogue states pursuing WMD as a tool to achieve other goals aside from deterrence, and pursuance in a more traditional sense such as deterring offensive US actions. For example, it can be argued that North Korea realizes that the US is not necessarily deterred from attacking it due to the threat of WMD retaliation, but rather mostly by the potential destruction of Seoul by DPRK conventional military forces. While Smith addresses this DPRK conventional military threat, the emanation of deterrence – whether conventional or WMD – is a bit muddled.

Iran is another example of the US being somewhat deterred not directly from its WMD but rather from its ability to respond to US aggression through other means, namely proxy groups and terrorist activities. Nuances involving the threats of WMD to regional US allies instead of aimed directly against the United States and the distinction between a rogue state’s coercion and deterrence strategy regarding WMD would have also strengthened the work. Perhaps Smith will address these issues in more depth in a subsequent publication.

Topical critique aside, *Deterring America* should be considered essential reading for students of deterrence theory and practitioners alike. Near East policy analysts will also strongly benefit from the read as it provides an essential level of analysis for viewing the actions of all the key actors in the region, including non-state groups. Practitioners of even such a specific subfield as terrorism analysis are beginning to understand that strategic maneuvering regarding WMD proliferation is affecting their struggle to constrict the operational environments of terrorists. The work is informative, concise and will be thought provoking even for those who already possess a thorough understanding of deterrence.

George Michael. *The Enemy of My Enemy. The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 397 + viii pp; \$34.95. ISBN: 0-7006-1444-3.

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