Excerpts from Deterring America
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The idea that denying oneself options can actually be beneficial may seem counterintuitive at first. Schelling describes this phenomenon as a "paradox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself." Considering the game of "chicken" may help to clarify this concept. If two drivers are about to start accelerating toward one another, it would send a powerful message if one driver chose to throw his steering wheel out the window. The other driver would then have no choice but to concede the contest or suffer catastrophe. Of course, while this technique can be a very effective way of enhancing resolve where interests or capability are lacking, the hidden danger is that it is always possible that both drivers will make the same decision, locking in an even worse outcome than if the position had been surrendered at the outset. The crucial factor, then, will be which side is able to make the first move, leaving the other with the only "last clear chance" to avoid calamity.
- Chapter Two: Deterrence Theory and its Flaws [I]n an era of mass globalization, enabling a few individuals to kill thousands and potentially millions, the containment "box" is becoming more porous than ever - hardly a sturdy barrier against creeping regional threats and terrorism. Unfortunately, security interests no longer end at one's border, for the dangers can come from all directions at any time, and the harm caused can be virtually irreparable. The United States cannot necessarily afford the luxury of relying on the threat of punishment to deter the use of WMD; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons have taken the rungs out of the escalation ladder, creating a world in which the first break in the WMD taboo is likely to be catastrophic. - Part III: Responding to the Threat The Bush administration's willingness to take action against prospective threats appears to reflect a realization that, at some point in the future, either deterrence will fail against a regional adversary or a rogue state will transfer WMD to a terrorist client, requiring the United States to have a near perfect defense to prevent catastrophe. In effect, the specter of WMD presents the equivalent of the famous Irish Republican Army assassination threat against UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, but instead directed at an entire nation: "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." - Chapter Six: Preemptive and Preventive War |